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 SCHOOL SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
JASON P. NANCE∗ 
 
   In the aftermath of several highly publicized incidents of school violence, 
public school officials have increasingly turned to intense surveillance methods to 
promote school safety. The current jurisprudence interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment generally permits school officials to employ a variety of strict 
measures, separately or in conjunction, even when their use creates a prison-like 
environment for students. Yet, not all schools rely on such strict measures. Recent 
empirical evidence suggests that low-income and minority students are much 
more likely to experience intense security conditions in their schools than other 
students, even after taking into account factors such as neighborhood crime, 
school crime, and school disorder. These empirical findings are problematic on 
two related fronts. First, research suggests that students subjected to these intense 
surveillance conditions are deprived of quality educational experiences that other 
students enjoy. Second, the use of these measures perpetuates social inequalities 
and exacerbates the school-to-prison pipeline. 
    Under the current legal doctrine, students have almost no legal recourse to 
address conditions creating prison-like environments in schools. This Article 
offers a reformulated legal framework under the Fourth Amendment that is rooted 
in the foundational Supreme Court cases evaluating students’ rights under the 
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The historical justification courts 
invoke to abridge students’ constitutional rights in schools, including their Fourth 
Amendment rights, is to promote the educational interests of the students. This 
justification no longer holds true when a school creates a prison-like environment 
that deteriorates the learning environment and harms students’ educational 
interests. This Article maintains that in these circumstances, students’ Fourth 
Amendment rights should not be abridged but strengthened. 
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I grew up on the West Side of Chicago, where I attended and 
graduated from Orr Academy High School. My high school 
seemed like its own personal prison. From the moment we 
stepped through the doors in the morning, we were faced with 
metal detectors, x-ray machines and uniformed security. Upon 
entering the school, it was like we stepped into a prison. 
—Edward Ward,  
Testimony for the U.S. Senate Committee Hearing on  
“Ending the School-to-Prison Pipeline.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Several years ago, I taught math in a public middle school located in 
a large metropolitan city. Approximately 95 percent of the students 
attending this school were Hispanic or African American, and nearly all 
of the students came from low-income households and qualified for free 
or reduced school lunch. Having attended public schools in 
homogeneous, suburban areas with relatively low poverty rates, I was 
unprepared for what I experienced during my first year of teaching. At 
 
 1. Ending the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 1 (2012) (testimony of Edward Ward, Blocks Together, Dignity in Schools 
Campaign) [hereinafter Edward Ward Testimony], available at http://www.judiciary.
senate.gov/pdf/12-12-12WardTestimony.pdf. 
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the public schools I attended, students had substantial freedom. There 
were no police officers on campus. I never walked through a metal 
detector. My personal belongings were never searched. I never saw a 
drug-sniffing dog. There were no surveillance cameras. I was free to 
leave campus at lunchtime. I felt that my teachers and administrators 
trusted me, and I trusted them. Overall, my public school experience 
helped me become independent and prepared me well for college and 
many of the challenges I now face. 
Students attending the school at which I worked, however, had a 
very different educational experience from mine. At times, students 
walked through metal detectors. Police officers maintained a visible 
presence in the school. Students were not permitted to use lockers, and 
they could only carry clear backpacks. After class ended, students 
marched in a line to their next class. Students were not allowed to use the 
restrooms during breaks between classes but used them as a group during 
class time in the presence of a teacher. Before classes began, students 
were not permitted to walk around in the school, go to the library, sit 
outside, or even sit at their desks. Rather, students were required to sit on 
the floor in the hallways or the gymnasium until the first bell rang when 
they would march to their first class. There was also a clear sense of 
distrust that I had to work hard to overcome, especially as a white 
teacher. 
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court issued the landmark 
ruling of Brown v. Board of Education2 to address the racial inequalities 
that existed in the public school system.3 That ruling eliminated the 
“separate but equal” doctrine established in Plessy v. Ferguson4 as 
applied to public schools and no longer allowed public schools to 
segregate students solely on the basis of race.5 The Court in Brown 
recognized that education “is a principal instrument in awakening the 
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, 
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.”6 The Court 
reasoned that segregating children on the basis of race “generates a 
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect 
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”7 The sense 
 
 2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3. Id. at 493. 
 4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).  
 5. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (“We conclude that, in the field of public education 
the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. . . . [P]laintiffs . . . by reason of the 
segregation complained of, [are] deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 6. Id. at 493. 
 7. Id. at 494. 
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of inferiority is magnified when sanctioned by law and “affects the 
motivation of a child to learn.”8 
More than fifty years after Brown, great racial inequalities still exist 
in our public education system—inequalities that may generate feelings 
of inferiority and affect the hearts and minds of children in a way that is 
difficult to undo. Much scholarly attention has been devoted to 
discussing many of these inequalities, including resource disparities in 
schools that minorities attend and minorities’ disproportionate exposure 
to exclusionary measures.9 The focus of this Article, however, addresses 
another inequality that has received far less attention in the legal 
scholarship: the implementation of strict security measures in schools 
serving primarily minority students. Such measures include using metal 
detectors, conducting random sweeps for contraband, having law 
enforcement present on campus, controlling access to school grounds by 
locking or monitoring gates, and installing security cameras. 
Recent empirical research indicates that schools serving higher 
proportions of minority and low-income students are more likely to 
implement these harsh, intense security conditions than other schools—
even after accounting for factors such as school crime, neighborhood 
crime, school disorder, school location, and school size.10 This is a 
problem that must be addressed for at least two reasons. First, research 
suggests that schools that rely on intense surveillance methods often have 
poor school climates that are detrimental to student learning and positive 
student growth, meaning that poor students and students of color often do 
 
 8. Id.  
 9. See, e.g., Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources 
and the Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 404–09 (2012) 
(explaining the inferior resources and opportunities that low-income minorities receive); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1461, 1470–72 (2003) (describing the substantial disparities in school 
funding); Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
2417, 2436–42 (2004) (discussing school finance reform); Catherine Y. Kim, Policing 
School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 866 (2012) (discussing several empirical 
studies that demonstrate racial disparities in school punishment); James E. Ryan, Schools, 
Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999) (describing the funding gaps relative to 
low-income minority students); see also DANIEL J. LOSEN & JONATHAN GILLESPIE, THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE DISPARATE IMPACT OF 
DISCIPLINARY EXCLUSION FROM SCHOOL (2012), available at 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/
school-to-prison-folder/federal-reports/upcoming-ccrr-research/losen-gillespie-
opportunity-suspended-2012.pdf (analyzing national data from the U.S. Department of 
Education’s Office of Civil Rights showing racial disparities in suspensions).  
 10. See Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1, 41 
(2013). 
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not enjoy the same educational experiences that other students do.11 
Second, the use of intense surveillance methods is a component of a 
larger, more complex problem called the school-to-prison pipeline. The 
school-to-prison pipeline refers to the practice of funneling students 
currently enrolled in school to the juvenile justice system or removing 
students from school temporarily or permanently, thereby creating 
conditions under which the students are more likely to end up in prison.12 
Many school officials use intense surveillance techniques in conjunction 
with zero-tolerance policies to push low-performing students who are 
perceived as troublemakers out of school.13 Unfortunately, minority 
students—especially African-American male students—are 
disproportionately affected by such policies, leading to tremendous 
inequalities in both our public schools and our justice system.14 
This Article goes beyond the current literature by proposing a new 
framework for evaluating the constitutionality of suspicionless search 
practices in schools under the Fourth Amendment. Under the current 
framework, using metal detectors, drug-sniffing dogs, security cameras, 
random sweeps, or a combination of these practices in conjunction with 
locked gates and law enforcement officers, is permitted because 
preventing school crime is an important government interest that 
overrides students’ expectations of privacy.15 This holds true even 
though low-income and minority students are subjected to these 
conditions more often. This Article proposes a reformulated legal 
framework to address these issues that is rooted in the foundational 
Supreme Court cases evaluating students’ rights under the First, Fourth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments. The historical justification for diluting 
students’ constitutional rights in schools—including their Fourth 
Amendment rights—is to promote students’ educational interests by 
 
 11. Cf. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., New Data from U.S. Department of 
Education Highlights Educational Inequities around Teacher Experience, Discipline and 
High School Rigor (Mar. 6, 2012), available at http://www.ed.gov/news/press-
releases/new-data-us-department-education-highlights-educational-inequities-around-
teache (detailing the inequalities that exist for minorities in the public education system 
across the country and explaining that “[t]he undeniable truth is that the everyday 
educational experience for many students of color violates the principle of equity at the 
heart of the American promise”).  
 12. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., FEDERAL POLICY, ESEA 
REAUTHORIZATION, AND THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 2 (2011), available at 
http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/ceb35d4874b0ffde10_ubm6baeap.pdf; School to Prison 
Pipeline, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, http://www.naacpldf.org/case/school-
prison-pipeline (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).  
 13. See infra Part II.  
 14. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 12, at 2–3; School to 
Prison Pipeline, supra note 12. 
 15. See infra Part III.A.  
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providing an environment that is conducive to learning.16 This Article 
maintains that when this justification no longer holds true—when 
conducting suspicionless searches or, worse, creating a prison-like 
environment contributes to a deteriorated learning climate and harms 
students’ educational interests—students’ Fourth Amendment rights 
should not be abridged, but strengthened. Accordingly, students should 
have the opportunity to submit evidence showing that strict security 
measures do not promote their educational interests but detract from an 
educational climate, and thus their privacy interests should be given 
greater consideration against the government’s interest in conducting 
these searches. Such a test more closely aligns with the overall tenor of 
cases evaluating students’ constitutional rights in schools and is more 
consistent with good education policy and practice. Further, because 
primarily students of color more often are subjected to intense 
surveillance environments, applying this test will help ameliorate the 
disproportionate use of strict security measures against minorities. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the empirical 
evidence revealing disparities in the use of strict security measures along 
racial and economic lines. Part II contextualizes the empirical evidence, 
explaining why schools rely on strict security measures and how their 
use is inconsistent with good educational and social policy and 
contributes to the school-to-prison pipeline. Part III proposes a 
reformulated legal framework to evaluate the constitutionality of 
suspicionless searches under the Fourth Amendment that may help 
prevent the disparate application of strict security measures and provide a 
better learning environment for all students. 
I. THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The unequal treatment of minorities in public schools, especially of 
black males, is well documented and remains one of the most pressing 
educational issues of our day.17 Nancy Dowd explains that for many 
 
 16. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (stating that the Court, 
in evaluating students’ Fourth Amendment rights, must “strike the balance between the 
schoolchild’s legitimate expectations of privacy and the school’s equally legitimate need 
to maintain an environment in which learning can take place”); see also Vernonia Sch. 
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) (explaining that the nature of students’ 
Fourth Amendment rights in schools “is what is appropriate for children in school” and 
further stating that “Fourth Amendment rights, no less than First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere; the ‘reasonableness’ 
inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children”).  
 17. See, e.g., CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE: 
STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 53–54 (2010) (observing that minority students are 
over-represented in restrictive special education programs); Angela A. Ciolfi & James E. 
Ryan, Race and Response-to-Intervention in Special Education, 54 HOW. L.J. 303,  
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minority students, particularly black males, “school is not a place of 
education and opportunity. Instead, it is a place that significantly 
undermines opportunity and pushes [them] into the juvenile justice 
system.”18 Pedro Noguera observes that in schools throughout United 
States, black males “are more likely than any other group in American 
society to be punished (typically through some form of exclusion), 
labeled, and categorized for special education (often without an apparent 
disability), and to experience academic failure.”19 Recent data 
disseminated by the U.S Department of Education’s Office of Civil 
Rights (OCR) confirmed the disparate treatment of minority students in 
public schools.20 That data, gathered from surveys from over 72,000 
schools around the United States serving approximately 85 percent of the 
nation’s public school students, show that minority students are 
disciplined more often and more severely, have less access to complex, 
higher-level courses, and more often are assigned teachers that are less 
experienced and are lower paid.21 Responding to these findings, U.S. 
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan declared that “[t]he undeniable 
truth is that the everyday educational experience for many students of 
color violates the principle of equity at the heart of the American 
 
326–27 (2011) (showing that black students are “over-represented in more restrictive 
educational settings such as separate classrooms or schools”); Nancy E. Dowd, What 
Men? The Essentialist Error of the “End of Men,” 93 B.U. L. REV. 1205, 1216–22 (2013) 
(explaining that minorities, particularly black males, are physically marginalized, 
psychologically and socially isolated, disproportionately disciplined, have less access to 
mental health services, but are more likely to be referred to an under-resourced mental 
health system); Theresa Glennon, Knocking against the Rocks: Evaluating Institutional 
Practices and the African American Boy, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 10, 11 (2002) 
(stating that black males are more likely to be labeled as disabled and are more likely to 
be referred to educational programs that provide fewer services and institute greater 
control); Theresa Glennon, Looking for Air: Excavating Destructive Educational and 
Racial Policies to Build Successful School Communities, in JUSTICE FOR KIDS: KEEPING 
KIDS OUT OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 107, 110–11 (Nancy E. Dowd ed., 2011) 
[hereinafter Glennon, Looking for Air] (citing several studies that show that minority 
students are disproportionately disciplined); Russell J. Skiba, Suzanne E. Eckes & Kevin 
Brown, African American Disproportionality in School Discipline: The Divide between 
Best Evidence and Legal Remedy, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1071, 1086–89 (2010) 
(discussing empirical evidence of racial disproportionality in school discipline). Indeed, 
providing equal, high-quality education opportunities for all students is one of the 
greatest challenges our nation faces today. See generally DEREK W. BLACK, EDUCATION 
LAW: EQUALITY, FAIRNESS, AND REFORM (2013); LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT 
WORLD AND EDUCATION: HOW AMERICA’S COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE 
OUR FUTURE (2010). 
 18. See Dowd, supra note 17, at 1216.  
 19. PEDRO A. NOGUERA, THE TROUBLE WITH BLACK BOYS AND OTHER 
REFLECTIONS ON RACE, EQUITY, AND THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION xvii (2008).  
 20. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 11. 
 21. Id. 
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promise.”22 Daniel Losen and Jonathan Gillespie conducted additional 
analysis on the OCR data and found that one out of every six black 
students enrolled in K–12 public schools has been suspended at least 
once, but only one out of twenty white students has been suspended.23 
Further, they found that one out of every four disabled black children 
was suspended during the 2009–10 school year.24 
Unfortunately, the OCR data do not allow researchers to probe 
deeply into reasons behind the disparities because the data do not list the 
offenses that led to the suspensions.25 However, other studies indicate 
that minority students, especially black students, are indeed punished 
disproportionately relative to their violations of school rules.26 For 
example, Kelly Welch and Allison Ann Payne conducted a national 
study involving 294 public schools and discovered that schools serving 
higher percentages of black students were more likely to suspend, expel, 
or refer students to law enforcement officials for violating school rules.27 
Welch and Payne also discovered that schools serving higher percentages 
of black and low-income students were less likely to rely on softer forms 
of punishment, such as oral reprimands or referrals to visit with school 
counselors.28 In addition, Welch and Payne found that schools serving 
more black students were less likely to consider alternative forms of 
discipline such as requiring students to complete community service or 
participate in restorative justice initiatives.29 Indeed, the OCR recently 
 
 22. Id.  
 23. LOSEN & GILLESPIE, supra note 9, at 6. 
 24. Id. at 7.  
 25. Id. at 32–33.  
 26. See TONY FABELO ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., 
BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW SCHOOL DISCIPLINE RELATES 
TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 45 (2011), available at 
http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Breaking_Schools_Rules_
Report_Final.pdf (reporting the results of a statewide Texas study showing that black 
students were more likely to be removed from class and more likely to be disciplined for 
“discretionary reasons”); DANIEL J. LOSEN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, DISCIPLINE 
POLICIES, SUCCESSFUL SCHOOLS, AND RACIAL JUSTICE 4–5 (2011), available at 
http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/NEPC-SchoolDiscipline.pdf (demonstrating that racial 
disparities in the number of school suspensions has increased considerably over the last 
forty years); Catherine P. Bradshaw et al., Multilevel Exploration of Factors Contributing 
to Overrepresentation of Black Students in Office Disciplinary Referrals, 102 J. EDUC. 
PSYCHOL. 508, 511–12 (2010) (reporting that black students were more likely than white 
students to receive office referrals after controlling for teachers’ ratings of their students’ 
classroom behavior); Ciolfi & Ryan, supra note 17, at 327–28 (citing several studies 
showing that minority students are punished disproportionality relative to their offenses). 
 27. See Kelly Welch & Allison Ann Payne, Racial Threat and Punitive School 
Discipline, 57 SOC. PROBS. 25, 25, 36 (2010)  
 28. Id. at 36–37. 
 29. Id. at 37.  
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acknowledged that although the racial disparities in student discipline 
rates may be caused by a range of factors, the abundant research suggests 
that these disparities “are not explained by more frequent or more serious 
misbehavior by students of color.”30 
While many studies demonstrate the disparate treatment of 
minorities in schools in several facets,31 very few examine the 
disproportionate use of strict security measures on minorities. I recently 
tested the hypothesis that low-income and minority students are subject 
to intense surveillance methods more often than other students, even 
after taking into account additional factors that might influence a school 
official’s decision to implement strict security measures.32 To test this 
hypothesis, I analyzed restricted data from the U.S. Department of 
Education’s 2009–10 School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS). The 
SSOCS is a rich, national dataset that contains information submitted by 
school principals dealing with school security practices, school crime, 
and school demographics.33 The dataset was the restricted version, 
meaning that the data contained detailed, sensitive information such as 
the number of incidents that involved weapons or drugs that occurred on 
school campuses during the school year.34 The restricted dataset recently 
became available to researchers who met specific conditions.35 
 
 30. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR COLLEAGUE 
LETTER ON NONDISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 4 n.7 (Jan. 8, 
2014), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201401-
title-vi.pdf [hereinafter DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER]. 
 31. See, e.g., supra note 17.  
 32. For a detailed description of the data, analysis, and findings see Nance, 
supra note 10, at 28. In this Article, I briefly summarize the most important findings.  
 33. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, SCHOOL 
SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY PRINCIPAL QUESTIONNAIRE: 2009–10 SCHOOL YEAR 5 
[hereinafter 2009–10 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE], available at http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/
ssocs/pdf/SSOCS_2010_Questionnaire.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
 34. See Statistical Standards Program: Getting Started, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. 
STATS., http://nces.ed.gov/statprog/instruct_gettingstarted.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
The restricted-use data has “a higher level of detail in the data compared to public-use 
data files.” Id. Although the restricted datasets are not available to the general public, 
datasets that contain less sensitive data for prior school years are currently available. Id. 
Those datasets can be downloaded at School Survey on Crime and Safety (SSOCS), 
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ssocs/data_products.asp 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014).  
 35. NCES provides restricted-use datasets to certain researchers in qualified 
organizations. Statistical Standards Program: Getting Started, supra note 34. To qualify,  
an organization must provide a justification for access to the restricted-use 
data, submit the required legal documents, agree to keep the data safe from 
unauthorized disclosures at all times, and to participate fully in unannounced, 
unscheduled inspections of the researcher’s office to ensure compliance with 
the terms of the License and the Security Plan form.  
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The 2009–10 SSOCS restricted-use dataset provides a unique 
opportunity to view on a national scale the types of strict security 
measures that schools employ. In the 2009–10 SSOCS, school principals 
were asked to respond to several questions relating to school security.36 
For example, principals were asked if, during the 2009–10 school year, it 
was a practice in the principal’s school to require students to pass 
through metal detectors each day, perform one or more random metal 
detector checks on students, perform one or more random sweeps for 
contraband (for example, drugs or weapons), control access to school 
grounds during school hours, use security cameras to monitor the school, 
and have any security guards or law enforcement officers present at the 
principal’s school at least once a week.37 Principals responded with a 
“yes” or “no” to each one of these questions.38 The dependent variables 
for my study represented the likelihood that a school principal responded 
affirmatively to using various combinations of strict security practices 
that can create an intense surveillance environment.39 
I measured student race by including the percentage of the schools’ 
minority student population.40 I measured student poverty by including 
the percentage of students who were eligible for free or reduced-price 
lunch.41 I also included other student demographic information that 
 
Id. See also Statistical Standards Program: Applying for a Restricted-Use Data License, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, available at http://nces.ed.gov/statprog/instruct_
apply.asp?type=rl (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) (providing guidelines for applying to 
receive a restricted-use dataset license). 
 36. 2009–10 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 33, at 5, 8. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Nance, supra note 10, at 31. I examined four different combinations of the 
strict security practices: (a) metal detectors and guards; (b) metal detectors, guards, and 
random sweeps; (c) metal detectors, guards, random sweeps, and security cameras; and 
(d) metal detectors, guards, random sweeps, security cameras, and locked gates. Id. 
 40. Id. at 32. A school’s minority population consisted of the number of 
students who were African American, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, and American 
Indian/Alaskan Native. See SIMONE ROBERS ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 
INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY 2011, at 112 (2012) [hereinafter 2011 
INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY], available at http://nces.ed.gov/
pubs2012/2012002rev.pdf. Racial data for the 2009–10 SSOCS came from the 2007–08 
CCD school data file. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 2009–2010 SCHOOL 
SURVEY ON CRIME AND SAFETY (SSOCS): RESTRICTED-USE DATA FILE USER MANUAL 29 
[hereinafter 2009–10 RESTRICTED USE MANUAL] (2011) (on file with author). Although 
there was a two-year difference, it is unlikely that a school would experience a major 
shift in student population over a two-year period.  
 41. Nance, supra note 10, at 32. Free or reduced-price lunch is a common proxy 
to measure student poverty. See, e.g., Michael Heise, Litigated Learning, Law’s Limits, 
and Urban School Reform Challenges, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1419, 1441 (2007); Federal 
Education Budget Project, NEW AM. FOUND., http://febp.newamerica.net/background-
analysis/federal-school-nutrition-programs (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (“Researchers often 
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might account for whether a school decided to employ strict surveillance 
methods such as the percentage of students who have limited English 
proficiency, the percentage enrolled in special education, and the 
percentage who scored in the bottom 15 percent on the state standardized 
exam.42  
Importantly, I accounted for school crime in my analysis.43 The 
SSOCS asks school officials to report the number of incidents of various 
types of school crime during the school year.44 Because the severity of 
the school crimes may influence whether schools implement tighter 
security measures,45 I categorized the crimes according to their degree of 
severity. I included violent incidents;46 threats of physical attack with or 
without a weapon;47 incidents involving possession of a firearm, 
explosive device, knife, or other sharp object;48 incidents of distribution, 
possession, or use of illegal drugs, inappropriate prescription drugs, or 
alcohol;49 incidents of theft of items over $10;50 and incidents of 
vandalism.51 
Further, I accounted for school disorder, which also may influence a 
school’s decision to implement tighter security measures.52 In addition, I 
controlled for the principals’ perception of crime problems near the 
school,53 the involvement of various external community groups in the 
schools,54 the geographic region of the schools,55 school urbanicity,56 
 
use free or reduced price lunch (FRPL) enrollment figures as a proxy for poverty at the 
school level, because Census poverty data (which is used at the state and district level) is 
not available disaggregated below the school district level and is not collected 
annually.”). 
 42. Nance, supra note 10, at 33. See also Aaron Kupchik & Geoff K. Ward, 
Race, Poverty, and Exclusionary School Security: An Empirical Analysis of U.S. 
Elementary, Middle, and High Schools, YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 10) (on file with author). 
 43. Nance, supra note 10, at 33. See also Welch & Payne, supra note 27, at 27 
(“One factor presumed to be closely associated with school punitiveness and disciplinary 
practice is the level of school crime and disorder.”). 
 44. 2009–10 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 33, at 11.  
 45. See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 42 (manuscript at 13–14). 
 46. Violent incidents included rape or attempted rape, sexual battery other than 
rape, robbery with or without a weapon, and physical attacks with or without a weapon. 
2009–10 SSOCS QUESTIONNAIRE, supra note 33, at 11. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Nance, supra note 10, at 33–34. See also Kupchik & Ward, supra note 42 
(manuscript at 10–11); Welch & Payne, supra note 27, at 27.  
 53. Nance, supra note 10, at 34.  
 54. Id.  
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each school’s total student enrollment,57 the building level,58 and whether 
the school was nontraditional like a magnet or charter school.59 Finally, I 
included the school’s average percentage of students that attend school 
each day.60 
The empirical analysis revealed that both student race and student 
poverty were strong predictors for whether a school chose to employ 
high surveillance security methods. And, importantly, these findings held 
true even after controlling for the other above-listed factors that might 
influence the school officials’ decisions to employ strict security 
measures, such as school crime, neighborhood crime, and school 
disorder.61  
These findings support what many scholars have observed 
anecdotally—that large, urban schools serving primarily low-income or 
minority students are more likely to create intense surveillance 
environments than other schools.62 They suggest that schools with high 
percentages of minority or low-income students tend to rely on 
heavy-handed, punitive-based measures to maintain order and control 
crime. They also suggest that these schools are more inclined to coerce 
students into compliance and to promote safety by identifying, 
apprehending, and excluding students that school officials perceive as 
being dangerous, disruptive, or low-performing.63 
The findings further suggest that schools serving primarily affluent 
or white students find alternative ways to create safer environments. 
 
 55. Id. at 35.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 35–36.  
 61. Other significant predictors included student enrollment (positive 
predictor), schools located in the South (positive predictor), schools located in urban 
areas (positive predictor), the percentage of students who had limited English proficiency 
(negative predictor), and the percentage of students who received low test scores 
(positive predictor). Id. at 41–42. 
 62. See, e.g., Kevin P. Brady, Sharon Balmer & Deinya Phenix, School-Police 
Partnership Effectiveness in Urban Schools, 39 EDUC. & URBAN SOC. 455, 456–57 
(2007) (explaining that “[a]n increasing fear of school violence coupled with the public’s 
misperceptions of [school safety] has caused school officials, especially those located in 
urban areas, to implement more punitive-based . . . policies”); Pedro A. Noguera, 
Preventing and Producing Violence: A Critical Analysis of Responses to School Violence, 
65 HARV. EDUC. REV. 189, 206 (1995) (observing that most urban high schools serving 
high percentages of minority students rely upon coercive or excessive forms of control to 
promote school safety).  
 63. See Paul Hirschfield, School Surveillance in America: Disparate and 
Unequal, in SCHOOLS UNDER SURVEILLANCE 38, 45 (Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres 
eds., 2010); Noguera, supra note 62, at 192. 
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However, this does not mean that schools serving affluent and white 
students do not rely on any security measures at all. But schools serving 
primarily white and affluent students appear to be more inclined to use 
less intrusive measures, such as surveillance cameras.64 As Paul 
Hirschfield maintains, “criminalization in middle class schools is less 
intense and more fluid than in the inner-city . . . . In short, the gated 
community may be a more apt metaphor to describe the security 
transformation of affluent schools, while the prison metaphor better suits 
that of inner-city schools.”65 Similarly, Pedro Noguera observes: “I 
frequently visit schools in suburban communities and private schools that 
serve affluent students and see quite clearly that poor children in the 
inner city are more likely to receive an education that places greater 
emphasis on order and control than academic rigor.”66 
II. CONTEXTUALIZING THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
These empirical findings showing disparities in the application of 
strict security measures are disturbing and problematic on several fronts. 
This Part provides the theoretical backdrop exploring why some schools 
choose to rely on strict security measures, why there are disparities in the 
application of strict security measures, and the societal and educational 
harms that strict security measures cause—especially when applied 
disproportionately to minority students. 
A. The Movement towards Increased Reliance on Strict Security 
Measures 
Why some schools choose to rely on intense surveillance methods 
while others do not is a complex question. The current state of affairs is 
due, at least in part, to several highly publicized acts of school violence, 
as well as several federal, state, and local laws, policies, and practices. 
 
 64. See 2011 INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY, supra note 40, at  
164–65 (disaggregating the use of security measures by student race and socio-economic 
status). In fact, recent data from the U.S. Department of Education indicate that schools 
serving high percentages of white or affluent students tend to rely more on drug-sniffing 
dogs than other schools. See id. at 165; see also Kupchik & Ward, supra note 42, 
(manuscript at 12) (indicating that high schools with lower percentages of racial 
minorities were more likely to use drug-sniffing dogs than other schools). Nevertheless, 
as the empirical analysis summarized here suggests, schools serving higher percentages 
of minority students are more likely to use several different surveillance methods in 
conjunction that create a more intense surveillance environment than other schools. Id. 
 65. Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing for Prison?: The Criminalization of School 
Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79, 84 (2008).  
 66. See Pedro A. Noguera, Schools, Prisons, and Social Implications of 
Punishment: Rethinking Disciplinary Practices, 42 THEORY INTO PRAC. 341, 348 (2003).  
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Unfortunately, many of these laws, policies, and practices also have 
contributed to the disparate application of strict security measures on 
minority and low-income students. 
1. A RESPONSE TO HIGHLY PUBLICIZED ACTS OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE 
Even though schools remain among the safest places for children,67 
one cannot discount the role that fear plays in a school official’s decision 
to adopt strict security practices.68 In the wake of several highly 
publicized incidents of school violence, it is no surprise that school 
officials and policymakers have resorted to strict security measures to 
demonstrate to the public that they are implementing measures to reduce 
 
 67. See, e.g., BARBARA FEDDERS, JASON LANGBERG & JENNIFER STORY, SCHOOL 
SAFETY IN NORTH CAROLINA: REALITIES, RECOMMENDATIONS & RESOURCES 4 (2013), 
available at http://www.legalaidnc.org/public/learn/media_releases/2013_
MediaReleases/school-safety-in-north-carolina.pdf (“School violence that results in death 
is extremely rare. Young people are much more likely to be harmed in the home or on the 
street than they are in schools.”) (citations omitted); Randall R. Beger, The “Worst of 
Both Worlds”: School Security and the Disappearing Fourth Amendment Rights of 
Students, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 336, 338 (2003) (“Contrary to popular belief, schools 
remain among the safest places for children.”); Randy Borum et al., What Can Be Done 
about School Shootings? A Review of the Evidence, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 27, 27 (2010) 
(explaining that the number of homicides that occur on school grounds represents less 
than 1 percent of the annual homicides of children age 5 to 18, and that “any given school 
can expect to experience a student homicide about once every 6,000 years” (citation 
omitted)); Nance, supra note 10, at 17; Noguera, supra note 66, at 343 (“Despite surveys 
that suggest a growing number of teachers and students fear violence in school, schools 
in the United States are generally safe places.” (citation omitted)); Arne Duncan, 
Resources for Schools to Prepare for and Recover from Crisis, HOMEROOM: U.S. DEP’T 
OF EDUC. BLOG (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.ed.gov/blog/2012/12/resources-for-schools-
to-prepare-for-and-recover-from-crisis/ (“Schools are among the safest places for 
children and adolescents in our country, and, in fact, crime in schools has been trending 
downward for more than a decade.”). 
 68. AARON KUPCHIK, HOMEROOM SECURITY: SCHOOL DISCIPLINE IN AN AGE OF 
FEAR 3 (2010) (explaining that fears and insecurities are powerful motivators to increase 
security measures in response to high-profile incidents of school violence); Beger, supra 
note 67, at 338 (“Widely publicized incidents of juvenile violence in public schools have 
created the public misconception that such behavior is commonplace.”); Borum et al., 
supra note 67, at 27 (“[S]chool shootings receive such intense publicity, and are such 
inherently disturbing events, that they generate an inflated perception of danger.”); 
Hirschfield, supra note 63, at 38 (“The importation of surveillance tactics from criminal 
justice and the military into schools is most commonly attributed to elevated fears of 
school violence and a growing realization that ‘it can happen here.’”); Matthew J. Mayer 
& Peter E. Leone, School Violence and Disruption Revisited: Equity and Safety in the 
School House, 40 FOCUS ON EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 1, 6 (2007) (“[M]edia coverage of 
school violence has shaped the public’s beliefs, and in many cases has led to a distorted 
perception of violence in schools, as well as adolescent violence more generally.”). 
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school crime, maintain order, and protect children.69 As Torin Monahan 
and Rodolfo Torres observe, “the threat of ‘another Columbine’ (or 
Virginia Tech, and so on) haunts the social imagery, leading parents, 
policy makers, and others to the sober conclusion that any security 
measure is worth whatever trade-offs are involved in order to ensure 
safety.”70 Indeed, since the Newtown shootings, several lawmakers and 
school officials have responded by enacting policies that include the use 
of intense surveillance methods to monitor not only campus visitors but 
their own students as well.71 
 
 69. Brady, Balmer & Phenix, supra note 62, at 456 (“An increasing fear of 
school violence coupled with the public’s misperceptions of the actual degree of violence 
in our nation’s schools has caused school officials, especially those located in urban 
areas, to implement more punitive-based school discipline policies and practices for 
responding to and preventing student crime and violence.”); see Welch & Payne, supra 
note 27, at 26. 
 70. Torin Monahan & Rodolfo D. Torres, Introduction, in SCHOOLS UNDER 
SURVEILLANCE, supra note 63, at 1, 2–3. Elizabeth Scott has described this general social 
phenomena as the “moral panic problem.” See Elizabeth S. Scott, Miller v. Alabama and 
the (Past and) Future of Juvenile Crime Regulation, 31 L. & INEQUALITY 535, 541 (2013) 
(describing that although school shootings are rare events, after the Columbine shootings 
“legislatures across the country rushed to pass strict zero tolerance laws, making it a 
crime to threaten violence in school”).  
 71. See, e.g., S.B. 2267, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (proposing 
funding to equip schools with “alarms, cameras, electronic door locks, emergency 
response call buttons, intercom systems, key or pass cards, [and] metal detectors”); S.B. 
2230, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013) (funding security aid to provide schools with 
metal detectors, electronically operated partitions, and security cameras); H. 2343, 2013 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2013) (providing funding to schools for purchasing 
security equipment); H.B. 612, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2013) (proposing funding to 
school districts for “surveillance cameras, metal detectors, and other safety equipment”). 
See also Tom Barton, Board Members Unsure Metal Detectors Needed at Beaufort 
County Schools, ISLAND PACKET (May 8, 2013), http://www.islandpacket.com/2013/
05/08/2495164/board-members-unsure-metal-detectors.html (discussing a South Carolina 
school board’s consideration of adding metal detectors in schools); Doug Finke, State 
Board of Education Calls for $874M Increase in School Funding, J. STAR (Jan. 25, 2013, 
12:01 AM), http://www.pjstar.com/news/x1503807290/State-Board-of-Education-calls-
for-874M-increase-in-school-funding (“The Illinois State Board of Education called for 
an $874 million increase in state spending on elementary and secondary education on 
Thursday, including $20 million that would be available for school security measures.”); 
Liz Hayes, Burrell Board Focuses on School Safety, TRIBLIVE (May 7, 2013, 12:51 AM), 
http://triblive.com/neighborhoods/yourallekiskivalley/yourallekiskivalleymore/3970294-
74/burrell-security-wagner#axzz2THQXVCDR (discussing a Pennsylvania school 
district that is considering using metal detectors more regularly, installing X-ray 
equipment to screen student backpacks, and making windows “more bulletproof”); Mary 
Wilson, Pa. Senate Leader Suggests Steep Increase in School Security Funding, 
NEWSWORKS (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/item/49955-pa-
senate-leader-suggests-steep-increase-in-school-security-funding?linktype=hp_
topstorylist (“The leader of Pennsylvania’s Senate wants to increase grant funding 
twentyfold for school security, including armed guards.”). 
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Nevertheless, while fear of an extreme incident most likely explains 
some of the impetus behind more schools adopting strict security 
measures, it fails to fully explain this recent trend for at least two 
reasons. First, as scholar Paul Hirschfield points out, fear does not 
explain why schools have maintained or intensified their security efforts 
long after the public panic over highly publicized violent incidents has 
subsided.72 Second, fear does not fully explain why some schools adopt 
harsher, stricter security measures than other schools if, as the school 
shootings demonstrate, an extreme incident can occur in any type of 
school, including a school in a white suburban neighborhood. 
2. THE SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY LAWS 
Some school officials may adopt strict security measures as part of 
an overall effort to push low-performing students out of their schools. 
Federal and state school accountability laws require school officials to 
test students each year and impose severe consequences for schools that 
do not meet certain standards. For instance, under the No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2001 (NCLBA),73 all schools that receive federal funds 
are required to test students at various stages during grades three through 
twelve in reading, language arts, math, and science.74 Under the NCLBA, 
schools must demonstrate improvement in student test scores across all 
student sub-groups to avoid receiving a negative label, being placed on 
probation, or eventually being taken over by the state.75 To avoid these 
sanctions, many scholars are concerned that school officials may push 
low-performing students out of their schools by suspending, expelling, or 
referring low-performing students to the juvenile justice system.76 James 
 
 72. See Hirschfield, supra note 65, at 85; Welch & Payne, supra note 27, at  
26–27.  
 73. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.) 
 74. See Testing: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. at 
http://www2.ed.gov/nclb/accountability/ayp/testing-faq.html (last modified on Nov. 17, 
2014). See also Monahan & Torres, supra note 70, at 5.  
 75. Monahan & Torres, supra note 70, at 5.  
 76. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT: HOW 
“ZERO TOLERANCE” AND HIGH-STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE 
SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 28–33 (2010), available at http://b.3cdn.net/advancement/
d05cb2181a4545db07_r2im6caqe.pdf; KUPCHIK, supra note 68, at 28 (discussing that the 
NCLBA puts pressure on schools to push out low performing students); Linda 
Darling-Hammond, Race, Inequality and Educational Accountability: The Irony of ‘No 
Child Left Behind’, 10 RACE, ETHNICITY & EDUC. 245, 252–55 (2007); Deborah Gordon 
Klehr, Addressing the Unintended Consequences of No Child Left Behind and Zero 
Tolerance: Better Strategies for Safe Schools and Successful Students, 16 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 585, 602–03 (2009); James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the 
No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 969–70 (2004); see also Jason P. 
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Ryan observes, “the temptation to exclude low-performing students, 
enhanced by the NCLBA, can hardly be denied: One less student 
performing below the proficiency level increases the overall percentage 
of students who have hit that benchmark.”77 Empirical evidence provides 
support for these theories. For example, one study of Texas’s educational 
accountability program, which became a model for the NCLBA, found 
that test scores were boosted in part by finding ways to keep students out 
of the testing count and excluding thousands of other students from 
school.78 Empirical studies examining accountability programs in other 
states find similar results.79 
The incentive that the NCLBA creates to push low-performing 
students out is bolstered by the fact that the NCLBA does not have the 
same accountability standards for graduation rates.80 Data on graduation 
rates since the NCLBA was passed in 2002 are telling. Focusing on only 
the one hundred largest school districts in the United States, which serve 
about 40 percent of the nation’s African-American, Latino, and Native 
American students, graduation rates have plummeted since 2002.81 
Specifically, from 2002 to 2006, seventy-three of those school districts 
reported decreases in graduation rates, and seventeen of those districts 
reported decreases greater than 10 percent.82 Further, since the NCLBA 
was passed, the overall graduation rates of these districts are low. In 
2006, only ten of those one hundred districts graduated 80 percent of 
their students; sixty-seven of them had a graduation rate of 66 percent or 
lower; and in twenty-five of those districts, less than half of their 
students graduated.83 
3. THE DECLINE OF STUDENTS’ FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
Over the last few decades, students’ Fourth Amendment rights have 
steadily declined as courts have provided school officials with 
 
Nance, Random, Suspicionless Searches of Students’ Belongings: A Legal, Empirical, 
and Normative Analysis, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 367, 397 (2013). 
 77. Ryan, supra note 76, at 969; see also Darling-Hammond, supra note 76, at 
252 (“Perhaps the most adverse, unintended consequence of NCLB’s accountability 
strategy is that it undermines safety nets for struggling students rather than expanding 
them. The accountability provisions of the Act actually create large incentives for schools 
that can to keep such students out and to hold back or push out students who are not 
doing well.”).  
 78. Darling-Hammond, supra note 76, at 253.  
 79. Id. at 252–55. 
 80. Ryan, supra note 76, at 970.  
 81. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 76, at 30.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. 
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constitutional leeway to maintain order and discipline within schools.84 
This movement in the law has made it easier for school officials to rely 
on intense surveillance measures in their schools without fear of legal 
challenges. To conduct a search, school officials are not required to 
obtain a warrant, show probable cause, or have an individualized 
suspicion that a student participated in wrongdoing.85 As a result, school 
officials are permitted to invoke a host of suspicionless search practices 
in schools. For example, courts routinely uphold the use of metal 
detectors86 and random searches through lockers,87 and—if this issue 
were presented to a court—most likely would uphold the use of 
surveillance cameras in the hallways and public rooms through the 
school.88 Further, no law prohibits school officials from using these strict 
security measures in combination even when their cumulative use creates 
an intense environment that may not be conducive to a healthy learning 
climate.89 
4. FEDERAL AND STATE POLICIES SUPPORT A PUNITIVE APPROACH 
Finally, the increase of strict security measures may be due, at least 
in part, to broad government support for “tough on crime” policies. 
Under a theory developed by scholar Jonathon Simon, federal and state 
governments have played a centralized role in education that once 
 
 84. See infra Nance, supra note 10, at 7–12; Part III; see also Nance, supra note 
76, at 376, 391–94; James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 1335, 1415 (2000) (stating that “the Court’s decisions regarding student searches 
rest on the value-laden view that maintaining discipline is necessary to preserve the 
educational process of schools”).  
 85. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653–54 (1995); New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985). 
 86. See, e.g., Hough v. Shakopee Pub. Sch., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104 (D. 
Minn. 2009); In re Latasha W., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 886–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); State 
v. J.A., 679 So. 2d 316, 319–20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); In re F.B., 726 A.2d 361, 366 
(Pa. 1999). 
 87. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 666 N.W.2d 142, 150 (Iowa 2003); In re Patrick 
Y., 746 A.2d 405, 414–15 (Md. 2000); In re Isiah B., 176 Wis. 2d 639, 500 N.W.2d 637, 
641 (1993). However, there is a substantial disagreement among courts regarding 
whether students possess an expectation of privacy in their lockers. See KIM ET AL., supra 
note 17, 115–16; Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s Unanswered (Misanswered) 
Fourth Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847,  
933–37 (2011); Nance, supra note 76, at 411–12 and accompanying notes. 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(“Videotaping of suspects in public places, such as banks, does not violate the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment . . . .”). However, courts do not permit surreptitious video surveillance in 
certain locations such as student lockers rooms or bathrooms. See Brannum v. Overton 
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 499 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that surreptitious video 
surveillance of a student locker room violates the Fourth Amendment). 
 89. See infra Part III.B.2.  
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belonged to local governments and have recast disruptive students as 
criminals who must be reformed through punitive measures.90 
Zero-tolerance policies are a good example of this mindset.91 Under the 
Federal Gun-Free Schools Act, states receiving federal education funds 
are required to have a state law that compels schools to expel students for 
at least one year for bringing a firearm to school.92 Although this law 
recently has softened somewhat by permitting superintendents to modify 
the expulsion requirement on a case-by-case basis,93 many states and 
schools have adopted laws and policies modeled after the Federal 
Gun-Free Schools Act by creating strict rules that impose predetermined 
consequences for certain acts, irrespective of the surrounding 
circumstances or intent of the students.94 These zero-tolerance policies 
have pushed more students out of schools and have increased referrals to 
the juvenile justice system.95 
 
 90. See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON 
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 215–16, 
218–21 (2007); Hirschfield, supra note 65, at 87. But see Welch & Payne, supra note 27, 
at 27 (suggesting that the “‘governing through crime’ orientation . . . does not address the 
changing nature of discipline that is not a result of federal or state initiatives because 
much discipline continues to originate with individual teachers and principals”).  
 91. So-called “zero-tolerance policies” refer to policies that require school 
officials to issue severe punishments, such as suspension or expulsion, for both serious 
and minor infractions. See Russell J. Skiba & M. Karega Rausch, Zero Tolerance, 
Suspension, and Expulsion: Questions of Equity and Effectiveness, in HANDBOOK OF 
CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 1063, 
1063 (Carolyn M. Evertson & Carol S. Weinstein eds., 2006). 
 92. See 20 U.S.C. § 7151(b)(1) (2012). 
 93. See id. See also Federal Law on Guns in Schools, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT 
GUN VIOLENCE (May 21, 2012), http://smartgunlaws.org/federal-law-on-guns-in-schools/. 
 94. See Klehr, supra note 76, at 589. 
 95. Id. at 590. Barry Feld explains that schools that adopt zero-tolerance 
policies towards trivial violations adopt the “broken window” theory that failure to 
address minor infractions will lead to more serious disruption. See Feld, supra note 87, at 
886–87. As a result, schools often suspend, expel, or refer students to the juvenile justice 
system for minor infractions such as disorderly conduct, cursing, fighting, or bringing 
nail clippers, pocket knives, scissors, or plastic knives to campus. See id. Scholars and 
policymakers have strongly criticized zero tolerance policies, demonstrating that they are 
ineffective and counterproductive. See, e.g., Am. Psychol. Ass’n Zero Tolerance Task 
Force, Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in Schools? An Evidentiary Review and 
Recommendations, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 852, 859–60 (2008). Very recently, the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights issued a resource guide for improving 
school climate and discipline, suggesting that schools employ a tiered approach to 
discipline and reminding schools that the Federal Gun-Free Schools Act “does not require 
that states or schools implement wide-ranging zero-tolerance policies or rely on 
exclusionary discipline” for acts that do not involve firearms. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR IMPROVING SCHOOL CLIMATE AND 
DISCIPLINE 15 (2014) [hereinafter GUIDING PRINCIPLES], available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/guiding-principles.pdf. 
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Additional evidence of government support for a punitive approach 
to educating children includes programs that have provided schools with 
millions of dollars for strict security measures. For example, the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) 
initiatives allowed schools to request up to $500,000 to support half the 
cost of their security programs.96 Schools used this money to purchase 
metal detectors, locks, lighting, to hire security and law enforcement 
officers, and to fund other deterrent measures.97 Since 1995, COPS has 
provided schools with approximately $913 million for security 
measures.98 In another federal program, created by the Safe and 
Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act,99 Congress authorized money 
for schools to acquire metal detectors, electronic locks, surveillance 
cameras, or other related equipment and technologies.100 Further, several 
states have programs that provide money to schools for strict security 
measures,101 and the Newtown tragedy has prompted other state 
 
 96. See OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
2011 SECURE OUR SCHOOLS PROGRAM 1 (2011), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/
pdf/2011AwardDocs/CSPP-SOS-CHP/SOSMethodology.pdf. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FACT SHEET: SECURE OUR SCHOOLS (Sept. 2011), available at 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2011AwardDocs/CSPP-SOS-CHP/2011-SOS-Post-
FactSheet.pdf.  
 99. 20 U.S.C. §§ 7101–65 (2006).  
 100. 20 U.S.C. § 7115(b)(2)(E)(ii) (2006). Notably, the grant application 
procedures make clear that the Department of Education views school security equipment 
as only one component of an overall strategy designed to create a safe and healthy 
learning environment. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. ET AL., SAFE SCHOOLS/HEALTHY 
STUDENTS: INFORMATION AND APPLICATION PROCEDURES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 22 
(2009), available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/dvpsafeschools/2009-184l.pdf. In the 
2009 application, no more than 10 percent of the grant could be used to fund security 
equipment. Id. The remainder of the grant must be used for programs designed to address 
student safety and health holistically by providing behavioral, social, and emotional 
support; mental health services; early childhood social and emotional learning programs; 
and alcohol, tobacco, and other drug prevention activities for students, their families, and 
the community. Id. at 22–24.  
 101. See ALA. CODE § 41-15B-2.2(b)(2)(b.1.)(2) (2013) (“School Safety 
Enhancement Programs eligible for grants shall be designed to prevent or reduce violence 
in the schools . . . . The programs shall relate to one or more of the following: . . . (v) 
Safety plans involving the use of metal detectors, other security devices, uniforms, school 
safety resource officers, or other personnel employed to provide a safe school 
environment.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1185(b) (2012) (“A public school may request 
funding assistance from the state for the installation of safety equipment including, but 
not limited to, video surveillance cameras, metal detectors, and other similar security 
devices.”); 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1302-A(c)(9) (2013) (“[T]he office is 
authorized to make targeted grants to school entities to fund programs which address 
school violence, including . . . metal detectors, protective lighting, surveillance 
equipment . . . and training in the use of security-related technology.”); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 59-66-30 (2013) (“Using funds appropriated by the General Assembly, each public 
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legislatures to pass or consider passing legislation that will provide 
additional funding to schools for school security.102 These federal and 
state initiatives often are promoted by powerful networks of criminal 
justice professionals who serve as law enforcement officers, private 
security officers, school security consultants, and vendors of school 
security equipment.103 Lamentably, these funds could be better used to 
support alternative, more effective programs that reduce school crime 
and do not harm the learning environment.104 
B. Why Disparities Exist 
The empirical evidence indicates that minority and low-income 
students are disproportionately subjected to strict security measures.105 
No doubt, some of the policies described above contribute to these 
disparities, such as the political appeal of a “tough on crime” approach in 
inner-city schools, money from state and federal governments for strict 
security measures, and school accountability policies that motivate 
school officials to push low-performing students out of schools. 
Pedro Noguera, a scholar who has studied the plight of inner-city 
schools and youth for decades, offers further insight into why schools 
serving disadvantaged students tend to adopt strict security measures. He 
observes that schools traditionally carry out three important roles: (1) to 
sort children according to their abilities and aptitudes and place them on 
paths that will affect their future occupations and societal roles as adults; 
(2) to socialize children by teaching them norms and values that are 
central to our society and social order; and (3) to provide a custodial 
function by protecting and caring for children while they are away from 
their parents.106 According to Noguera, schools cannot accomplish the 
 
middle, junior high, and high school in the State must be equipped with one hand-held 
metal detector.”). 
 102. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Paul J. Hirschfield & Katarzyna Celinska, Beyond Fear: Sociological 
Perspectives on the Criminalization of School Discipline, 5 SOC. COMPASS 1, 6 (2011). 
 104. See Nance, supra note 10, at 48–56. See also Hirschfield & Celinska, supra 
note 103, at 6. Indeed, as Paul Hirschfield and Katarzyna Celinska point out, the billions 
of tax dollars spent on mass incarceration deprives schools of needed funds to hire more 
qualified teachers, better counselors and mental health services, and alternative means to 
improve student behavior. Id.  
 105. See supra Part I.  
 106. Noguera, supra note 66, at 344. As one might imagine, exactly what role 
public schools do and should play has been the subject of much debate. See, e.g., Betsy 
Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict between Authority and Individual 
Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1649 (1986) (“The mission of schools as 
transmitters of social, moral, and political values makes it inevitable that disputes will 
arise over which values are to be inculcated and who is authorized to make these 
decisions. There is no consensus, for example, on whether schools should emphasize a 
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first two functions without maintaining order and control.107 However, 
while sorting children according to their presumed aptitudes and abilities, 
children soon learn where they stand and develop certain expectations 
about their future occupations and societal roles.108 They begin to 
comprehend that some of them will reap the benefits of an education and 
some will not. Those students who will benefit will acquire useful 
knowledge and skills, become admitted to college, have access to 
well-paying jobs, and assume leadership roles in private and public 
institutions.109 Students also understand that some of them will achieve at 
least minimum economic security.110 But students also understand that 
still others will not be admitted to college and will end up with dead-end 
jobs, struggle to meet basic needs with a poverty-level income their 
entire lives, and become subordinated.111 Students that comprehend that 
the educational process is not working for them—that they most likely 
will not enter college or have a promising career—have very few 
incentives to comply with school rules.112 Those students often cause the 
most trouble in schools.113 They misbehave out of frustration or 
embarrassment because they are behind academically and are not able to 
meet grade-level expectations.114 They recoil from the traditional 
educational system; challenge the mandatory attendance policies; disrupt 
classroom activities; and find other illegitimate ways to establish their 
 
common language, history, and culture promoting assimilationist and national norms, or 
emphasize pluralism and diversity.”). For an interesting discussion of two competing 
missions of schools, see Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional 
Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 64–69 (1996) 
(describing two different philosophies for the mission of public schools: (1) “social 
reconstruction,” where the school “is an institution where power is necessary only to 
facilitate the child in his attempts to reconstruct a new social order” and (2) “social 
reproduction,” where the school’s mission is to “proclaim the child’s place in society by 
inculcating society’s traditions and habits”).  
 107. Noguera, supra note 66, at 344; see also Levin, supra note 106, at 1648–49.  
 108. Noguera, supra note 66, at 344.  
 109. Id. at 343.  
 110. Id. at 344.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. See also MATTHEW P. STEINBERG ET AL., STUDENT AND TEACHER SAFETY 
IN CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE ROLES OF COMMUNITY CONTEXT AND SCHOOL SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION 27–31 (2011), available at http://ccsr.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/
publications/SAFETY%20IN%20CPS.pdf (finding that the academic skills of the 
students are strongly related to school safety); PAUL WILLIS, LEARNING TO LABOR: HOW 
WORKING CLASS KIDS GET WORKING CLASS JOBS 72 (1977) (arguing that for students 
who believe that knowledge and credentials acquired in schools are irrelevant, “the 
teachers’ authority becomes increasingly the random one of the prison guard, not the 
necessary one of the pedagogue”). 
 113. Noguera, supra note 66, at 343–44.  
 114. Id. at 342.  
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self-worth, identity, and status among their peers.115 Further, students 
who suffer from abusive home environments, have language barriers, 
have health problems, are neglected, frequently move from school to 
school, or are harassed or bullied by other students also tend to 
misbehave and be disruptive.116 Noguera argues that ultimately, then, it is 
the dire “needs of students and the inability of the schools to meet those 
needs” that causes students to be disruptive and dangerous at school.117 
School officials generally understand that students on dead-end 
educational paths or those who have the greatest needs typically tend to 
be more disruptive at school.118 However, rather than focusing on 
meeting students’ challenging needs; finding ways to keep students 
focused on learning or being intellectually engaged; preventing students 
from becoming restless, bored, or falling behind academically; inspiring 
them to understand that the educational system can and will work for 
them; or providing appropriate levels of nurturing and kindness, schools 
too often become fixated on maintaining order and discipline—
particularly because of the recent, highly publicized incidents of school 
 
 115. See STEINBERG, ET AL., supra note 112, at 46 (observing that low-achieving 
students are less likely to be engaged in school, more likely to be frustrated by their 
performance, more likely to misbehave, and less likely to respond appropriately to 
punishment).  
 116. See Noguera, supra note 66, at 342.  
 117. Id. Of course, these dire needs also underscore the reasons why schools that 
serve high concentrations of students who live in poverty and in unstable environments 
require more resources to properly educate. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, 
RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF SEGREGATION 29–30 (2006), 
available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED500822.pdf. However, schools serving 
disadvantaged students most often have fewer resources to serve students with greater 
needs. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 17, at 27–65 (reporting that disadvantaged 
students often receive unequal access to qualified teachers, lack access to high quality 
curriculum, and are subject to dysfunctional learning environments); Osamudia R. James, 
White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on White Identity 
Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (maintaining that majority-minority 
schools often have limited access to adequate resources), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2235771; Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, 
The Academic Consequences of Desegregation and Segregation: Evidence from the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1513, 1547 (2003) (finding that 
segregated black learning environments offer fewer resources to educate students); Gary 
Orfield, The Growth of Segregation: African-Americans, Latinos, and Unequal 
Education, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION 53, 67–69 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton, eds. 1996) (observing that 
low-income and minority students typically have less qualified teachers and fewer 
instructional resources and lamenting that “disadvantaged students face more barriers and 
receive less reinforcement to succeed in school”).  
 118. Noguera, supra note 66, at 344. 
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violence.119 Thus, schools serving large numbers of academically 
unsuccessful students, many of whom attend inner-city schools and are 
low-income or minority students, often use extreme forms of discipline, 
punishment, and control that include relying on strict security 
measures.120 Noguera observes: 
Such schools often operate more like prisons than schools. 
They are more likely to rely on guards, metal detectors, and 
surveillance cameras to monitor and control students, restrict 
access to bathrooms, and attempt to regiment behavior by 
adopting an assortment of rules and restrictions. . . . In any 
educational setting where children are regarded as 
academically deficient, and where the adults view large 
numbers of them as potentially bad or even dangerous, the 
fixation on control tends to override all other educational 
objectives and concerns.121 
The empirical findings discussed here provide support for 
Noguera’s theory. They indicate that large, urban schools serving large 
percentages of historically disadvantaged student populations are more 
likely to create intense surveillance environments than other schools.122 
C. Educational and Social Harms 
Instead of relying on strict security measures, many educational and 
sociological considerations suggest that schools should adopt alternative 
methods to reduce violence and school crime. One very important 
consideration is that the use of strict security measures in schools 
contributes significantly to the school-to-prison pipeline, which 
disproportionally affects students of color. The school-to-prison pipeline 
is a phenomenon that has been extensively discussed and criticized in the 
literature.123 It refers to the practice of funneling students directly into the 
juvenile justice system or suspending or expelling students, thereby 
creating conditions under which students are more likely to be arrested 
 
 119. Id. at 342, 345, 348. Again, this highlights the point that educators serving 
disadvantaged students require more resources than they currently have to help them 
address students’ acute needs in more productive ways.  
 120. Id. at 345. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See supra Part I. 
 123. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 87, at 884–95; Kim, supra note 9; Lisa Thurau & 
Joanna Wald, Controlling Partners: When Law Enforcement Meets Discipline in Public 
Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977 (2010). 
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and sent to prison.124 When strict security measures are used in 
conjunction with zero-tolerance policies, students discovered carrying 
contraband automatically are suspended, expelled, or arrested—
regardless of students’ motives.125 The result is that too many students 
spend more time out of school or are funneled into the juvenile justice 
system, neither of which is in those students’ best interests.126 Spending 
more time away from school causes students to fall behind academically, 
stigmatizes the suspended or expelled students, and precludes access to 
school resources that might address those students’ needs.127 
Unfortunately, such consequences may cause the students to continue 
their disruptive behavior because they become frustrated, embarrassed, 
or simply give up on the education system.128 The long-term 
consequences of exclusionary discipline practices are devastating to 
students. Several empirical studies show a correlation between 
exclusionary discipline policies and “school avoidance, diminished 
educational engagement, decreased academic achievement, increased 
behavioral problems, increased likelihood of dropping out, substance 
abuse, and involvement with juvenile justice systems.”129 
Law enforcement referrals and arrests can be even more detrimental 
to students’ futures. Catherine Kim, Daniel Losen, and Damon Hewitt 
report that an arrest of a student “nearly doubles the odds of dropping out 
of school and, if coupled with a court appearance, nearly quadruples the 
odds of dropout; lowers standardized-test scores; reduces future 
employment prospects; and increases the likelihood of future interaction 
with the criminal justice system.”130 They further report that student 
arrests can have a significant negative impact on other students and on 
the larger community. They continue:  
Classmates who witness a child being arrested for a minor 
infraction may develop negative views or distrust of law 
enforcement. Juvenile-court dockets and detention centers 
become crowded with cases that could be handled more 
efficiently and more effectively by school principals. And the 
community pays the costs associated with an increase in 
 
 124. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., supra note 12, at 2. 
 125. See supra Part II.A.4.  
 126. KIM ET AL., supra note 17, at 112–13. See also DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, 
supra note 30, at 4.  
 127. Noguera, supra note 66, at 345–46. See also DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, 
supra note 30, at 4.  
 128. Noguera, supra note 66, at 342, 345–46.  
 129. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 30, at 4–5.  
 130. KIM ET AL, supra note 17, at 113.  
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dropouts, crime, and unemployment, and, in extreme cases, the 
incarceration of children.131 
Apart from contributing to the school-to-prison pipeline, strict 
security measures may be harmful in and of themselves because they 
may contribute to poor learning climates. Most educators understand that 
trust is a fundamental component to the teaching and learning process.132 
Indeed, students learn best when they are treated with kindness and 
respect, have positive self-esteems, and have positive relationships with 
their classmates and their teachers.133 Educational scholar Linda 
Darling-Hammond observes that successful schools, especially in 
challenging environments, have “strong teaching faculties who work in 
organizational structures that create more coherence and a ‘communal’ 
orientation, in which staff see themselves as part of a family and work 
together to create a caring environment.”134 Yet many scholars argue that 
strict security measures undermine trust and send a negative signal to 
students—that they are dangerous and prone to commit illegal, violent 
acts.135 This message, scholars fear, may sour students’ attitudes towards 
school and school officials.136 Martin Gardner explained the problem in 
the following way: 
 
 131. Id.  
 132. See David Domenici & James Forman Jr., What It Takes to Transform a 
School inside a Juvenile Justice Facility: The Story of the Maya Angelou Academy, in 
JUSTICE FOR KIDS, supra note 17, at 283, 289 (“High achieving schools are places where a 
culture of trust dominates.”); Roger D. Goddard, Megan Tschannen-Moran & Wayne K. 
Hoy, A Multilevel Examination of the Distribution and Effects of Teacher Trust in 
Students and Parents in Urban Elementary Schools, 102 ELEM. SCH. J. 3, 3–4 (2001) 
(observing that trust is an important element of the learning process); Megan 
Tschannen-Moran & Wayne K. Hoy, A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the Nature, 
Meaning, and Measurement of Trust, 70 REV. EDUC. RES. 547, 547 (2000).  
 133. See Donna Lieberman, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, Testimony before the 
New York City Council Committee on Education and Public Safety Regarding the 
Impact of Over-Policing in Schools on Students’ Education and Privacy Rights, (June 14, 
2006), available at http://www.nyclu.org/content/over-policing-schools-students-
education-and-privacy-rights (last visited Jan. 28, 2013).  
134. DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 17, at 65.  
 135. See, e.g., Beger, supra note 67, at 340; Noguera, supra note 62, at 190–91. 
 136. See Martin R. Gardner, Student Privacy in the Wake of T.L.O.: An Appeal 
for an Individualized Suspicion Requirement for Valid Searches and Seizures in the 
Schools, 22 GA. L. REV. 897, 943 (1988); Hirschfield, supra note 63, at 46 (explaining 
that strict security measures produce barriers between students and their schools and are 
“a frequent cause of disunity or discord within the school community”); Jen Weiss, Scan 
This: Examining Student Resistance to School Surveillance, in SCHOOLS UNDER 
SURVEILLANCE, supra note 63, at 213, 227–28 (concluding after a qualitative study that 
strict security measures caused students to distrust school authorities).  
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In a very real sense, each and every student stands accused, has 
become a “suspect” in generalized school searches, especially 
given the special relationship of trust which supposedly exists 
between student and teacher. Surely a student even indirectly 
accused by his teacher as a possible thief or drug user suffers a 
greater indignity and loss of self-esteem by being subjected to a 
generalized search than does an airline passenger passing 
through a metal detector or a driver [through] a checkpoint. Far 
from “morally neutral,” school searches are instead particularly 
rife with moral overtones.137 
Along similar lines, Donna Liebermann, Executive Director of the 
New York Civil Liberties Union, testified that strict security measures do 
not contribute to environments that are conducive to educational and 
social growth.138 Rather, they “foster environments where children 
perceive that they are being treated as criminals; where they are 
diminished by such perceptions; and where they, consequentially, 
cultivate negative attitudes toward their schools.”139 Another teacher 
summed up her experience with strict security measures as follows: “The 
medium is the message. And the message that [strict security measures] 
give[] out is that we are afraid of our students.”140 
Indeed, scholar Tom Tyler has studied and written extensively about 
the social costs in communities subject to high surveillance and the threat 
of government punishment. Tyler believes that intense surveillance 
environments harm the social climate because their use implies distrust, 
decreasing people’s ability to feel positively about themselves and the 
organizations to which they belong.141 Further, Tyler observes that 
individuals subject to intense surveillance climates may also perceive 
such intrusions as unfair, causing them to become angry and less willing 
 
 137. Gardner, supra note 136, at 943. In addition, it should be emphasized that 
students are required to submit to searches against their will because they are subject to 
mandatory school attendance policies. Airline passengers, on the other hand, decide 
voluntarily to board a plane.  
 138. See Lieberman, supra note 133.  
 139. Id.  
 140. Carol Ascher, Gaining Control of Violence in the Schools: A View from the 
Field, 100 ERIC DIGEST 4 (1994), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/
ED377256.pdf. 
 141. See Tom R. Tyler & Lindsay E. Rankin, Legal Socialization and 
Delinquency, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 353, 
361 (Barry C. Feld & Donna M. Bishop eds., 2012); see also David Kipnis, Trust & 
Technology, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY & RESEARCH 39, 46–47 
(Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler, eds. 1996).  
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to comply with the law.142 Thus, regardless of whether intense 
surveillance works in the short term, its use introduces other unintended 
social costs such as distrust and paranoia, which have a deleterious effect 
on individuals’ willingness to cooperate and participate in the system in 
the long term.143 
Apart from their negative effect on the learning climate, there are 
serious questions regarding whether strict security measures actually 
promote school safety or only provide a false sense of security.144 For 
example, Abigail Hankin, Marci Hertz, and Thomas Simon recently 
conducted an extensive review of the literature regarding the impact of 
metal detector use in schools.145 They determined that there was 
“insufficient evidence to draw a conclusion about the potential beneficial 
effect of metal detector use on student and staff behavior or 
perceptions.”146 They further acknowledged that much of the research 
shows that the use of metal detectors correlates with “lower levels of 
students’ perceptions of security in school and higher levels of school 
disorder.”147 Interestingly, many scholars maintain that strict security 
 
 142. See Tyler & Rankin, supra note 141, at 361; Jason Sunshine & Tom Tyler, 
The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 
37 L. & SOC. REV. 513, 514 (2003). 
 143. See Tyler & Rankin, supra note 141, at 361–62. 
 144. See ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE 
SCHOOLHOUSE TO JAILHOUSE TRACK 8 (2005), available at 
http://www.advancementproject.org/sites/default/files/publications/FINALEOLrep.pdf 
(arguing that strict security measures may “produce a perception of safety, [but] there is 
little or no evidence that they create safer learning environments or change disruptive 
behaviors”); Ascher, supra note 140, at 4 (“Rather than offering reassurance, metal 
detectors and other mechanical devices, as well as security forces, are seen as providing a 
false sense of safety, if not a harsh symbol of the failure to create safe schools.”); Richard 
E. Redding & Sarah M. Shalf, The Legal Context of School Violence: The Effectiveness 
of Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Efforts to Reduce Gun Violence in 
Schools, 23 LAW & POL’Y 297, 319 (2001) (“It is hard to find anything better than 
anecdotal evidence” to demonstrate that strict security measures such as metal detectors 
and guards reduce violence in schools.). Research on the effectiveness of school security 
measures is extremely limited, especially causal research demonstrating the effects of 
strict security measures. See Mayer & Leone, supra note 68, at 12.  
 145. Abigail Hankin, Marci Hertz & Thomas Simon, Impacts of Metal Detector 
Use in Schools: Insights from 15 Years of Research, 81 J. SCH. HEALTH 100, 105 (2011).  
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. See also John Blosnich & Robert Bossarte, Low-Level Violence in 
Schools: Is There an Association between School Safety Measures and Peer 
Victimization?, 81 J. SCH. HEALTH 107, 107, 111–12 (2011) (finding that school security 
measures did not reduce violent behaviors related to bullying); Matthew J. Mayer & Peter 
Leone, A Structural Analysis of School Violence and Disruption: Implications for 
Creating Safer Schools, 22 EDUC. & TREATMENT OF CHILD. 333, 349–52 (1999) 
(concluding that student victimization and school disorder were higher in schools using 
strict security measures). But see Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Violence-Related Attitudes and Behaviors of High School Students—New York City, 
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measures may actually hamper school officials’ efforts to promote safe 
environments because their use may engender mistrust and alienate 
students, leading to more disorder in schools.148 
Furthermore, one must not forget that strict security measures 
cannot and will not prevent serious acts of violence from occurring on 
school grounds, which is the reason why these measures only provide an 
illusory sense of security. Crystal Garcia reports that a mere 32 percent 
of the school safety officers that she interviewed believed that strict 
security measures effectively prevented violence in their schools.149 The 
atrocity that took place in Littleton, Colorado, occurred at a school that 
 
1992, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 773 (1993), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00022011.htm (reporting that students 
who attended schools using metal detectors were less likely to carry a weapon inside a 
school (7.8 percent versus 13.6 percent), but the use of metal detectors did not reduce 
school violence); Renee Wilson-Brewer & Howard Spivak, Violence Prevention in 
Schools and Other Community Settings: The Pediatrician as Initiator, Educator, 
Collaborator, and Advocate, 94 PEDIATRICS 623, 626–27 (1994) (stating that one school 
system in New York City reported that after the school security staff began using 
hand-held metal detectors to conduct unannounced lobby searches of students at the 
beginning of the school day, weapon-related incidents decreased in thirteen of fifteen 
schools); Rachana Bhatt & Tomek Davis, The Impact of Random Metal Detector 
Searches on School Violence, Contraband Possession, and Perceptions of Safety 22–23 
(Dec. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www.yumpu.com/en/
document/view/11524996/the-impact-of-random-metal-detector-searches-on-georgia-
state- (reporting that, when comparing two school districts in Florida, the district that 
used random metal detector searches reduced the probability of a student bringing a 
weapon to school). 
 148. See KUPCHIK, supra note 68, at 7–9 (arguing that punitive measures 
increase rather than decrease student misbehavior). Ascher, supra note 140, at 5 (arguing 
that strict security measures “increase, rather than alleviate, tension in schools”); Beger, 
supra note 67, at 340 (explaining that “aggressive security measures produce alienation 
and mistrust among students”); Michael Easterbrook, Taking Aim at Violence, 32 
PSYCHOL. TODAY 52, 56 (1999) (arguing that strict security measures alienate students); 
Clifford H. Edwards, Student Violence and the Moral Dimensions of Education, 38 
PSYCHOL. SCHS. 249, 250 (2001) (observing that “intrusive strategies are likely to 
undermine the trust needed to build cooperative school communities capable of really 
preventing violence”); Mayer & Leone, supra note 147, at 350, 352 (finding that student 
disorder and victimization were higher in schools using strict security measures and 
arguing that “less attention should be paid to running schools in an overly restrictive 
manner and rather, schools should concentrate more on communicating individual 
responsibility to students”); Noguera, supra note 62, at 190–91 (observing that a “get 
tough” approach can hamper school officials’ efforts to create safe environments because 
coercive measures create mistrust and resistance among the student body); Noguera, 
supra note 66, at 345 (“When children are presumed to be wild, uncontrollable, and 
potentially dangerous, it is not surprising that antagonistic relations with the adults who 
are assigned to control them develop.”).  
 149. See Crystal A. Garcia, School Safety Technology in America: Current Use 
and Perceived Effectiveness, 14 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 30, 40 (2003). 
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had metal detectors and armed guards.150 In 2005, a student shot another 
student in a Red Lake, Minnesota, high school that had metal detectors, 
perimeter fencing, and guards.151 Ronald Stephens, an executive director 
of the National School Safety Center, points out that strict security 
measures are “more of a comfort” because “rule-followers will follow 
the rules[, and r]ule-breakers will break the rules.”152 Indeed, many 
scholars and commentators report that students know how to bring 
weapons into schools without being discovered by metal detectors.153 
But perhaps most importantly, strict security measures do not 
address the underlying problems associated with school crime and thus 
do not support the long-term solutions needed to effectively prevent 
school violence.154 At a recent conference titled “Safe and Secure 
Schools: Perspectives after Newtown,” Dr. Maurice Elias reminded us 
that “[o]ur children cannot learn, and our teachers cannot teach, in 
schools that are unsafe, unsupportive, uncaring, uncivil or lacking in 
intellectual challenge. . . . These are the ultimate sources of school 
security to children and in ways that are more lasting than metal 
detectors.”155 In fact, two comprehensive studies on school safety both 
independently concluded that one of the most important components—if 
not the most important component—for establishing safe, secure schools 
was not strict security measures but developing positive relationships 
among members of the school community. The first study, conducted by 
the U.S. Secret Service and the Department of Education,156 examined 
 
 150. See Marcus Wright, Experts Say Intrusive Security at Public Schools 
Reproduces Social Inequality, MICH. CITIZEN (Nov. 15, 2012), http://
michigancitizen.com/dps-eaa-tighten-security/. 
 151. Sara Neufeld & Sumathi Reddy, Violent Week Renews Metal Detector 
Debate, BALT. SUN, Oct. 14, 2006, at 1A, available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/
2006-10-14/news/0610140131_1_metal-detectors-school-students-park-elementary-
school. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See, e.g., Ascher, supra note 140, at 5 (“[T]hose few students intent on 
bringing in weapons are inevitably a step ahead of the security devices, which means that 
enforcement activities alone cannot create a safe school.”); Noguera, supra note 62, at 
193 (reporting that most students he spoke to in his visits to urban schools knew how to 
bring a weapon into schools using strict security measures without being detected); 
Neufeld & Reddy, supra note 151 (reporting that students interviewed stated that it was 
“easy to get around” metal detectors).  
 154. See KUPCHIK, supra note 68, at 6 (observing that the underlying issues for 
student misbehavior often are not addressed by schools). 
 155. Joe Green, South Jersey Schools Discuss Safety Following ‘Perspectives 
after Newtown’, NJ.COM (Jan. 23, 2013, 8:12 AM), http://www.nj.com/gloucester-
county/index.ssf/2013/01/south_jersey_schools_to_talk_s.html (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 156. See ROBERT A. FEIN ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS: A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS AND 
TO CREATING SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES (2002), available at http://www.secretservice.gov/
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thirty-seven incidents of school violence that occurred in U.S. schools 
from 1974 to 2000.157 The joint report concluded: 
In educational settings that support climates of safety, adults 
and students respect each other. A safe school environment 
offers positive personal role models in its faculty. It provides a 
place for open discussion where diversity and differences are 
respected; communication between adults and students is 
encouraged and supported; and conflict is managed and 
mediated constructively.158 
The second study, conducted by Matthew Steinberg, Elaine 
Allensworth, and David Johnson in the Chicago Public School System,159 
found that even in schools with large populations of students from high 
crime and high poverty areas, “it is the quality of relationships between 
staff and students and between staff and parents that most strongly 
defines safe schools.”160 Unfortunately, strict security measures may 
even hinder the development of strong relationships among members of 
the school community because they forge barriers of adversity and 
mistrust.161 Rather than addressing the underlying issues, investing 
millions of dollars in strict security measures diverts scarce resources 
away from other programs and strategies that have proven to effectively 
reduce school violence and enhance—not degrade—the learning 
environment.162 
The fact that schools with larger percentages of minority students 
appear to be more inclined to rely on strict security measures is 
 
ntac/ssi_guide.pdf. This report was brought again to the forefront by the Obama 
administration after the Newtown shootings. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NOW IS THE TIME 
12–13 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/wh_now_
is_the_time_full.pdf. 
 157. See FEIN ET AL., supra note 156, at 4.  
 158. Id. at 11. See also BARBARA FEDDERS, JASON LANGBERG & JENNIFER STORY, 
SCHOOL SAFETY IN NORTH CAROLINA: REALITIES, RECOMMENDATIONS & RESOURCES 6 
(2013), available at http://www.legalaidnc.org/public/learn/media_releases/2013_
MediaReleases/school-safety-in-north-carolina.pdf (“Positive relationships among 
students, families, teachers, administrators, and staff are the most effective tools in 
creating a safe school environment.”). 
 159. STEINBERG ET AL., supra note 112, at 15. 
 160. Id. at 1.  
 161. See, e.g., Beger, supra note 67, at 340; Noguera, supra note 62, at 190–91.  
 162. See, e.g., Hankin, Hertz & Simon, supra note 145, at 105 (“Metal detector 
programs are expensive, and funds spent on metal detectors would not be available for 
other programs and strategies that have been shown to be effective at reducing youth risk 
for violence and promoting pro-social behaviors.”); Nance, supra note 10, at 48–55 
(describing alternative methods that effectively reduce violence without degrading the 
learning environment). 
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particularly disturbing.163 The disproportionate use of strict security 
measures on minorities is fundamentally unfair, exacerbates the 
inequalities already present in our public education system, and can 
potentially perpetuate racial inequalities in our society. Schools that 
focus on custody and control rather than academic rigor may deprive 
students of quality educational experiences that other students enjoy, 
inhibiting minority students’ future educational and employment 
opportunities.164 In addition, as discussed above, the use of strict security 
measures—especially when used in conjunction with zero-tolerance 
policies—is part and parcel of the school-to-prison pipeline, which also 
severely limits students’ future opportunities.165 
Further, the use of strict security measures negatively affects 
minorities’ perceptions of government authorities and can skew their 
views about themselves and their roles in society.166 Henry Leonardatos, 
an experienced school administrator in urban schools, worries that 
minority students are subject to intense surveillance in both their 
neighborhoods and schools and, accordingly, see their school as simply 
“another appendage to the police state.”167 He is also concerned that 
when minority students are treated like criminals, they begin to act like 
criminals. He observes: 
They play the role that is expected of them—they will play the 
role of the criminal and victimizer because the cops will say, 
“don’t do this and don’t [do] that.” When you do that to a kid 
you’re telling the kid that this is how the world is supposed to 
be. You end [up] putting the idea in the kid’s head that this is 
what he’s supposed to be doing.168 
 
 163. See Nance, supra note 10, at 41.  
 164. See Kupchik & Ward, supra note 42, (manuscript at 7) (“[M]arginalized 
youth are presumed to be young criminals and treated as such through exposure to the 
hard edge of exclusive practices (e.g., police surveillance and metal detectors), while 
youth with social, political, and cultural capital are presumed to be near normal and 
habituated for social absorption in their selective exposure to inclusive security 
regimes.”). 
 165. See supra notes 123–29, and accompanying text. 
 166. See Noguera, supra note 66, at 343–44. 
 167. Daryl Khan, Perps or Pupils? Safety Policy Creates Prison-like New York 
City Schools, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Sept. 20, 2012), http://jjie.org/york-story/; 
accord VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND LATINO BOYS xiv, 
133–38 (2011) (maintaining that low-income and minority youth experience surveillance 
disproportionately because there is a “system in which schools, police, probation officers, 
families, community centers, the media, businesses, and other institutions systematically 
treat young people’s everyday behaviors as criminal activity”).  
 168. Khan, supra note 167. 
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Indeed, scholars have long understood that the way students are labeled 
and treated affects how students learn, act, view themselves, and what 
they become.169 
Moreover, the trust necessary to establish a healthy learning 
environment is severely undermined when minority students are aware 
that strict security measures are applied disproportionately.170 As Linda 
Darling-Hammond maintains,  
Young people are very observant. They note these patterns, and 
they understand when they have been identified as not 
deserving a high-quality, humane education. It is little wonder 
that in settings like these, students of color may come to doubt 
their academic ability and distrust the school, ultimately 
rejecting what it was to offer.171  
A recent example illustrates this point well. When Minerva Dickson 
discovered that other students were not subject to the strict security 
conditions she faced every day, it “blew her mind.”172 She commented, “I 
thought all schools were like mine . . . . I couldn’t believe a student could 
just walk into their school without dealing with all that.”173 
Unfortunately, the disproportionate use of strict security measures on 
minorities may further impair the often strained relationships of trust that 
already exist between many minority students and educators.174 
 
 169. See Noguera, supra note 66, at 343. See generally RONNIE CASELLA, BEING 
DOWN: CHALLENGING VIOLENCE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2001).  
 170. See Glennon, Looking for Air, supra note 17, at 112 (maintaining that it is 
difficult for schools to create positive learning climates when students see racial 
disparities in the application of discipline).  
 171. DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 17, at 65.  
 172. See Khan¸ supra note 167.  
 173. Id. Paul Hirschfield’s interview of a former inner-city student also 
illustrates the sense of unfairness some students perceive. This student commented,  
That school was run more like a prison than a high school. It don’t have to be 
nothing illegal about it. But you’re getting arrested. No regard for if a college 
going to accept you with this record. No regard for none of that, because 
you’re not expected to leave this school and go to college. You’re not 
expected to do anything. 
Hirschfield, supra note 65, at 79. 
 174. See Constance Flanagan et al., School and Community Climates and Civic 
Commitments: Patterns for Ethnic Minority and Majority Students, 99 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 
421, 423 (2007) (observing that studies show that minority groups report “a lower sense 
of school belonging than do their European American peers”); Susan Rakosi Rosenbloom 
& Niobe Way, Experiences of Discrimination among African American, Asian American, 
and Latino Adolescents in an Urban High School, 35 YOUTH & SOC. 420, 434 (2004) 
(stating that “[w]hen African American and Latino students were asked about their 
experiences with discrimination, they described hostile relationships with adults in 
positions of authority such as . . . teachers in school”); Rosa Hernández Sheets, Urban 
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Disproportionate use also may lead to more disorder and student 
behavior problems. One of the most consistent findings of empirical 
research is that students tend to follow rules when they believe those 
rules are fair and evenly applied.175  
III. A REFORMULATED FOURTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK 
This Part begins with the premise that the use of strict security 
measures in schools is inconsistent with students’ best interests and 
delegitimizes the educational process, especially when they are applied 
disproportionately to minorities and low-income students.176 The 
question is what to do about it. Elsewhere, I have strongly advocated that 
school-led reform is the most effective means for addressing this 
problem and have described several measures that school administrators 
can adopt to reduce violence more effectively in both their schools and in 
their communities, including restorative justice initiatives, a data-driven 
program called School-wide Positive Behavioral Interventions and 
Supports, and other initiatives targeted to develop emotional and social 
stability.177 I have also encouraged state and federal agencies to stop 
providing grants for strict security measures and, instead, to make those 
funds available to support alternative initiatives.178 Further, I have called 
on the U.S. Department of Education to provide grants for researchers to 
more closely study the harmful effects of strict security measures and 
have recommended that the Department of Education’s Office of Civil 
Rights play a more active role in addressing the disproportionate use of 
strict security measures on minority students.179 I also believe that state 
legislatures should provide the necessary funding, training, and 
incentives for schools to implement these alternative measures.  
 
Classroom Conflict: Student-Teacher Perception: Ethnic Integrity, Solidarity, and 
Resistance, 28 URB. REV. 165, 175–76 (1996) (reporting that minority students in a study 
on classroom conflict believed that their teachers did not care about them or respect them 
and that they abused their authority); cf. Noguera, supra note 62, at 201 (observing that 
many black communities believe that black children are not treated fairly in schools).  
 175. See KUPCHIK, supra note 68, at 7–8. See also Tyler & Rankin, supra note 
141, at 361–62 (finding that harsh surveillance systems engender mistrust, especially 
with respect to racial minority groups, leading them to disobey the rules). 
 176. See supra Part II. 
 177. See Jason P. Nance, School Security Considerations after Newtown, 65 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 103, 108–09 (2013). It bears noting that the U.S. Department of 
Education’s Office of Civil Rights very recently recommended that schools implement 
these alternative approaches to promote safe and orderly school climates. See DEAR 
COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 30, at app. 2; see also GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra note 
95, at 5–7.  
 178. Nance, supra note 10, at 55. 
 179. Id.  
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While I continue to support these recommendations, I believe that 
courts also have an important role to play in addressing this problem. In 
fact, courts are uniquely situated to address this issue in a way that 
perhaps other government bodies are not. Currently, policymakers and 
school officials are mired in a school security political quagmire 
resulting from recent highly publicized incidents of school violence—
most notably the Newtown tragedy. Policymakers and school officials 
are under enormous pressure to demonstrate to their constituencies that 
they are taking steps to address the perceived school safety crisis by 
spending substantial sums of money to purchase strict security measures. 
When political trends threaten core rights and values, courts have a 
responsibility to establish a clear constitutional standard to guide these 
government bodies. This is particularly important in schools because 
they are charged with the responsibility of inculcating students with the 
constitutional values that underpin our democracy.180 Once courts set this 
standard, I believe that lawmakers and school officials will put their 
resources to better use and tackle school crime in a more pedagogically 
sound manner that is more consistent with students’ constitutional rights.  
 
 180. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373–74 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the 
meaningful exercise of rights and responsibilities by a self-governing citizenry.”); Doe v. 
Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027–28 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (“Schools cannot expect their students to learn the lessons of good citizenship 
when the school authorities themselves disregard the fundamental principles 
underpinning our constitutional freedoms.”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 
U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (“That [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason 
for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to 
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of 
our government as mere platitudes.”); Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the 
Cure for De Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1992) 
(arguing that students have the right to be subjected to a socializing process that 
inculcates values consistent with the Constitution); Feld, supra note 87, at 963 (“Schools 
are the incubators of future citizens, and school officials convey moral lessons by their 
actions. Providing young people with real Fourth Amendment protection and meaningful 
enforcement mechanisms will better socialize them to participate effectively in a 
democratic society as adults.”); Martin R. Gardner, Strip Searching Students: The 
Supreme Court’s Latest Failure to Articulate a “Sufficiently Clear” Statement of Fourth 
Amendment Law, 80 MISS. L.J. 955, 997 (2011) (“Teaching students to obey society’s 
laws is surely a fundamental aspect of their learning the meaning of good citizenship.”); 
Betsy Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict between Authority and 
Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1648 (1986) (explaining that 
schools play a critical role in helping students learn necessary skills and society’s 
common values, which enables them to exercise the responsibilities of citizenship); 
Samantha E. Shutler, Random, Suspicionless Drug Testing of High School Athletes, 86 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1265, 1302–03 (1996) (“In order to preserve Constitutional 
reverence among a youth that is rapidly losing respect for many of the traditional 
underpinnings of our society, courts must not assist in eroding what little respect remains 
for the Constitution and the rights it provides.”). 
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Drawing from alternative theories proposed by scholars to evaluate 
Fourth Amendment rights in other contexts—as well as a recent theory 
Catherine Kim offered to evaluate students’ due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment181—this Part describes a reformulated test under 
the Fourth Amendment to evaluate the use of strict security measures in 
schools.182  
Before discussing the reformulated balancing test under the Fourth 
Amendment, it is important to explain that neither the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 currently provides a satisfactory method to redress the problem 
that harsh security measures are disproportionately applied to minority 
students generally.183 In Washington v. Davis,184 two unsuccessful black 
applicants to the Washington, D.C. police force claimed that the police 
department’s recruiting procedures discriminated on the basis of race in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.185 The applicants challenged the 
police department’s use of a personnel test that was designed to test 
verbal ability, vocabulary, reading, and comprehension, claiming that 
this test bore no relationship to job performance and excluded a 
disproportionate number of black applicants.186 The Supreme Court held 
that while the central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to 
prevent official misconduct discriminating on the basis of race, “a law or 
other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially 
discriminatory purpose, [will not be considered] unconstitutional solely 
 
 181. See Kim, supra note 9, at 864–65. 
 182. Alternative Fourth Amendment tests proposed by scholars can be distilled 
into two major categories: (a) tests that call for a reformulated balancing test (or to do 
away with a balancing test altogether); and (b) tests based on the political process theory. 
See Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107,  
127–36 (2010). In this Article, I propose a reformulated balancing test. However, a test 
based on the political process theory, which I will discuss in an upcoming scholarly 
article, would also be a suitable alternative framework to the test courts currently employ. 
The political process theory is most associated with the work of John Hart Ely, see JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87–88 (1980), 
but it has also been applied to the Fourth Amendment. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. 
Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998); Michael J. 
Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747,  
763–68 (1991); Slobogin, supra, at 136–38; William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, 
Government Power and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 588 (1992) 
[hereinafter Stuntz, Implicit Bargains]; William J. Stuntz, Local Policing after the 
Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137 (2002); Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis 
Review of General Suspicionless Searches and Seizures, 23 TOURO L. REV. 93 (2007). 
 183. The relevant provisions of Title VI are codified at 42 U.S.C.  
§§ 2000d–2000d-1 (2006). 
 184. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).  
 185. Id. at 232–33. 
 186. Id. at 234–35. 
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because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”187 The Court 
continued: 
[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving 
ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is 
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it 
may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. 
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole 
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by 
the Constitution.188 
Thus, Washington v. Davis and other cases that followed made clear that 
plaintiffs seeking to establish an Equal Protection Clause violation 
cannot rely solely on disparate impact; rather, they must also have other 
independent evidence that government officials acted with a 
discriminatory intent when crafting their policies.189 And, as Derek Black 
points out, “[e]vidence of discriminatory purpose in the various areas of 
educational inequality is rarely obvious. . . . [F]ew school systems today 
would openly engage in blatant discrimination.”190 Instead, racial 
discrimination today is more often the result of subtle or unconscious 
biases.191   
 
 187. Id. at 239. See also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252, 266 n.15 (1977) (“In many instances, to recognize the limited probative 
value of disproportionate impact is merely to acknowledge the ‘heterogeneity’ of the 
Nation’s population.”). 
 188. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. 
 189. See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (holding that although 
disparate impact “may provide an important starting point . . . impact alone is not 
determinative”); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 1983) (“It is, 
rather, the cumulative evidence of action and inaction which objectively manifests 
discriminatory intent.”); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1293 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987) (“The factors that are to be 
considered in determining whether actions were taken with discriminatory intent include 
the degree of any discriminatory effect; the historical background of the actions; the 
specific sequence of events leading up to the actions; the presence or absence of 
departures from normal procedures or substantive criteria; and the legislative history of 
the actions.”). See also MARK G. YUDOF, BETSY LEVIN, RACHEL F. MORAN, JAMES E. 
RYAN & KRISTI L. BOWMAN, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 430 (5th ed. 2012) 
(discussing Washington v. Davis and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp.).  
 190. See DEREK BLACK, EDUCATION LAW: EQUALITY, FAIRNESS, AND REFORM 
147 (2013). 
 191. Id. See also Gary Blasi, Advocacy against the Stereotype: Lessons from 
Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1276 (2002) (arguing that 
Americans’ behavior is driven to some degree by unconscious racial stereotypes); 
Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. 
REV. 741, 741 (2005) (arguing that discrimination is still pervasive, but most often 
emerging in the form of stereotyping or unconscious bias); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of 
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A satisfactory remedy under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 is also difficult to obtain under the current state of the law. Title VI 
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, color, or national origin 
by programs receiving federal funds.192 Although the OCR’s regulations 
prohibit schools from implementing facially neutral policies that result in 
disparate impact,193 in Alexander v. Sandoval194 the Supreme Court held 
that there is no private right of action to enforce the OCR’s disparate 
impact regulations.195 And while the OCR continues to enforce its 
disparate impact regulations,196 one significant enforcement challenge 
may be to identify a district or school policy that has a disparate impact 
on an identifiable racial group within that district or school.197 Stated 
 
Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1506–14 (2005) (discussing social cognition research that 
demonstrates that most people have implicit biases against racial minorities); Shani King, 
The Family Law Canon in a (Post?) Racial Era, 72 OHIO STATE L.J. 575, 628 (2011) 
(“[N]ot only is it rare for racial motives to be articulated, but they are often 
subconscious.”); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive 
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1161, 1164 (1995) (arguing that unconscious bias is the most prevalent form of 
discrimination).  
 192. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (“No person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.”).  
 193. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2) (2013) (providing that recipients of federal 
funds may not “utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of 
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin”).  
 194. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 195. Id. at 281. Although Sandoval did not address § 1983, Justice John Paul 
Stevens’s dissent suggested that private plaintiffs could assert that Title VI disparate 
impact regulations create a federal right, which is enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. 
at 299–302 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, most circuits have rejected this view. See 
Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 316 n.9 (4th Cir. 2003) (disallowing a private cause of 
action under § 1983 based on a federal regulation); Kissimmee River Valley Sportsman 
Ass’n v. City of Lakeland, 250 F.3d 1324, 1327 (11th Cir. 2001). But see Robinson v. 
Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1186–87 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that § 1983 allows a private 
cause of action for violating 34 C.F.R. § 100). Robinson is the only court of appeals case 
to adopt Stevens’s opinion on the § 1983 issue. Sam Spital, Restoring Brown’s Promise 
of Equality after Alexander v. Sandoval: Why We Can’t Wait, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER 
L.J. 93, 112 (2003). Further, federal appellate courts have rejected attempts to establish 
discriminatory intent based on the school officials’ deliberate indifference to the disparate 
impact of school policies. See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 
567–68 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 196. See, e.g., DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 30, at 11 (“Schools also 
violate Federal law when they evenhandedly implement facially neutral policies and 
practices that, although not adopted with the intent to discriminate, nonetheless have an 
unjustified effect of discriminating against students on the basis of race. The resulting 
discriminatory effect is commonly referred to as ‘disparate impact.’”).  
 197. See Daniel J. Losen & Christopher Edley, Jr., The Role of Law in Policing 
Abusive Disciplinary Practices: Why School Discipline Is a Civil Rights Issue, in ZERO 
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another way, in schools implementing intense surveillance conditions, 
typically all students in a school or district are subject to those 
conditions; thus, usually there will be no school or district policies that a 
student can identify that are applied disproportionately in that school or 
district.198 Nevertheless, simply because all of the students in a school or 
district are subject to the same harsh conditions should not justify a 
school or district’s actions to create a prison-like environment for 
students.  
Accordingly, I turn to a solution under the Fourth Amendment, 
which also has a distinct advantage. While the disparate application of 
strict security measures to minorities is inequitable and harmful, a 
prison-like environment for any student is harmful. Thus, a solution 
under the Fourth Amendment focuses on the crux of the problem: that a 
student’s—any student’s—expectation of privacy is violated when a 
school creates a prison-like environment in schools. It is the student’s 
sense of dignity that has been violated in a place where government 
officials should be preserving dignity, where students should be building 
self-worth and building confidence in themselves, each other, 
government institutions, and our democratic society.199 The fact that 
minorities are disproportionately subjected to prison-like environments 
in schools only exacerbates that indignity and teaches harmful lessons to 
both white and minority students, as well as low-income and affluent 
students.200 Subpart A describes the current test under the Fourth 
Amendment, and Subpart B proposes a reformulated balancing test. 
A. The Current Test 
School officials—who are government officials for constitutional 
law purposes, but are not law enforcement officers—generally perform 
or oversee two types of searches on students: (a) searches based on 
individualized suspicion to uncover evidence of wrongful behavior, and 
(b) random, suspicionless searches on the general student population or 
on a segment of the student population to deter school crime. Courts 
 
TOLERANCE: RESISTING THE DRIVE FOR PUNISHMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS: A HANDBOOK FOR 
PARENTS, STUDENTS, EDUCATORS, AND CITIZENS 237 (William Ayers, Bernardine Dohrn 
& Rick Ayers eds., 2001).  
 198. Indeed, many school districts throughout the country serve primarily 
minority students, especially those districts situated in large metropolitan areas. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 100 LARGEST PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND 
SECONDARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008–09, at iii (2010) (stating that 
the “majority of students in the 100 largest school districts were Hispanic or Black”).  
 199. See Gardner, supra note 136, at 943.  
 200. See Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and 
Race, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 42 (1997); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing 
Space: Why Racial Goodwill Isn’t Enough, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1999). 
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evaluate searches based on individualized suspicion under a 
reasonableness standard the Supreme Court developed in New Jersey v. 
T.L.O.,201 where the Court determined (1) “‘whether the . . . action was 
justified at its inception,’” and (2) “whether the search as actually 
conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place.’” 202 This Article, however, is 
primarily concerned with the use of suspicionless searches that are 
designed to deter, detect, or prevent crime by routinely subjecting a 
group of students—the vast majority of whom are innocent and have no 
plans at all to commit any type of wrongdoing—to a significant intrusion 
of their privacy interests.203 The Fourth Amendment currently offers 
students almost no protection from random, suspicionless searches 
designed to deter school crime.204 When the students’ expectation of 
privacy is weighed against the government interest in protecting students 
from harm, the government almost always prevails.205 
The test to evaluate suspicionless searches in schools was first 
described in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton.206 In Vernonia, the 
Court evaluated a school district’s suspicionless drug-testing program on 
student athletes.207 Students wishing to participate in interscholastic 
 
 201. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 202. Id. at 340–41 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). See also 
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009). Although outside of the 
scope of this Article, as commentators and courts have observed, the increased presence 
of law enforcement officers in schools and the increased use of evidence to prosecute 
students have complicated this analysis. See Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the 
Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School Searches 
Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2003) (arguing that 
courts should apply the probable cause standard when school searches involve law 
enforcement officers or when school officials are required to turn evidence of criminal 
violations over to the police); Lisa H. Thurau & Johanna Wald, Controlling Partners: 
When Law Enforcement Meets Discipline in Public Schools, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 977, 
982–86 (2009/10) (describing the disparate views of courts when analyzing student 
searches involving law enforcement officers).  
 203. In the Fourth Amendment scholarship and case law, these searches also 
have been called government dragnets, special needs searches, or administrative searches. 
I emphasize that my proposed legal analysis should not necessarily apply to situations 
where there is an imminent threat of harm to students, such as when school officials have 
received a warning from a credible source that a student has brought a loaded weapon to 
school and intends to harm other students.  
 204. See supra Part II.A.3. But see Nance, supra note 76, at 376–94 (arguing that 
the Fourth Amendment requires that students receive greater protection from highly 
intrusive search practices such as searches through students’ belongings).  
 205. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. 
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825–27 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 
664–65 (1995). 
 206. 515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995). 
 207. Id. at 650. 
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sports would be tested at the beginning of the season, and each week of 
the season, a student under the supervision of two adults would blindly 
select 10 percent of the student-athlete population for drug testing.208 In 
the fall of 1991, James Acton, a seventh-grade student who was well 
behaved and who did not have a drug problem, signed up to play 
football.209 The school officials would not allow James to participate in 
school athletics because he and his parents refused to sign a drug-testing 
consent form.210 The Actons claimed that Vernonia’s drug-testing 
program violated the Fourth Amendment, but the Court disagreed.211 
The Court observed that, as the text of the Fourth Amendment 
directs, the constitutionality of a government search ultimately turns on 
“reasonableness.”212 Whether a search meets the reasonableness standard 
is determined “by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.”213 Accordingly, the Court’s framework for evaluating 
suspicionless searches consists of the following three factors: (1) “the 
scope of the legitimate expectation of privacy at issue,” (2) “the character 
of the intrusion that is complained of,”214 and (3) “the nature and 
immediacy of the governmental concern at issue . . . and the efficacy of 
this means for meeting it.”215 
While acknowledging that students retain some expectation of 
privacy at school, the Court explained that the scope of students’ privacy 
rights “are different in public schools than elsewhere.”216 According to 
the Court, “the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ 
custodial and tutelary responsibilit[ies],” which required students’ 
 
 208. Id.  
 209. See Robert M. Bloom, The Story of Pottawatomie County v. Lindsay Earls: 
Drug Testing in the Public Schools, in EDUCATION LAW STORIES 337, 346 (Michael A. 
Olivas & Ronna Greff Schneider eds., 2008) (“At the time, James said, ‘I was like one of 
the smartest kids in class. I never got a referral (to the principal’s office) and I thought 
that was probably enough for them to see I wasn’t taking drugs.’”). 
 210. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 651. 
 211. Id. at 651, 664–65. 
 212. Id. at 652. The text of the Fourth Amendment reads:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.  
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 213. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652–53 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Assn., 
489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).  
 214. Id. at 658. 
 215. Id. at 660.  
 216. Id. at 656. 
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expectation of privacy to be diminished.217 The Court reasoned that if 
schools are to carry out their important educational mission and provide 
a “proper educational environment,” it must authorize “a degree of 
supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults.”218 
Thus, the nature of students’ constitutional rights “is what is appropriate 
for children in school.”219 Importantly, when establishing this diminished 
expectation of privacy of students, the Court relied on several prior cases 
where the Court similarly reduced students’ constitutional rights in light 
of the school’s responsibility to provide an appropriate environment 
conducive to learning.220 Viewing this diminished expectation of privacy 
against (a) the “minimally intrusive” drug-testing conditions that 
resembled conditions that students commonly encounter in public 
restrooms, (b) the school district’s important interest in deterring drug 
use, and (c) the rampant use of drugs among the student athletes in 
Vernonia School District, the Court upheld the district’s drug-testing 
policy.221 
Seven years later, in Board of Education v. Earls,222 the Court 
arguably abridged students’ Fourth Amendment rights even further. 
There, the Court upheld a program requiring students enrolled in 
extracurricular activities to submit to random drug testing.223 But unlike 
in Vernonia, where the Court justified those suspicionless searches in 
part because the drug problem in the district was “alarming,” the school 
district in Earls had made no such showing.224 
 
 217. See id. 
 218. Id. at 655.  
 219. Id. at 656.  
 220. Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 US. 675, 684 (1986); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 
U.S. 651, 682 (1977); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581–82 (1975)). 
 221. Id. at 658, 661–63. In dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor heavily 
criticized the Court’s decision to eliminate the individualized suspicion requirement 
outlined in T.L.O. Id. at 681 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). O’Connor was concerned that 
suspicionless searches send harmful messages to students that they cannot be trusted. Id. 
at 682. She argued,  
[I]ntrusive, blanket searches of schoolchildren, most of whom are innocent, 
for evidence of serious wrongdoing are not part of any traditional school 
function of which I am aware. Indeed, many schools, like many parents, 
prefer to trust their children unless given reason to do otherwise. As James 
Acton’s father said on the witness stand, “[suspicionless testing] sends a 
message to children that are trying to be responsible citizens . . . that they 
have to prove that they’re innocent . . . , and I think that kind of sets a bad 
tone for citizenship.”  
Id.  
 222. 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
 223. Id. at 825. 
 224. Id. at 849 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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In Earls, Lindsay Earls, a student enrolled in “the show choir, the 
marching band, the Academic Team, and the National Honor Society,” 
challenged Pottawatomie School District’s drug-testing policy as 
unconstitutional.225 Earls argued that Pottawatomie had failed to identify 
a special need for implementing its random drug-testing program 
because it had not demonstrated that her school had a drug problem.226 In 
a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court upheld Pottawatomie’s 
drug-testing policy.227 
The Court balanced the same three factors that it did in Vernonia, 
largely reaching the same conclusions.228 The Court explained that 
students’ privacy interests must be viewed in the context of the public 
school environment. That is, when “the government acts as guardian and 
tutor the relevant question is whether the search is one that a reasonable 
guardian and tutor might undertake.”229 Thus, a student’s privacy interest 
is limited in a place where the government has a responsibility to 
maintain discipline, health, and safety.230 
Departing somewhat from the holding in Vernonia, the Court held 
that it was unnecessary for the district to identify a drug abuse problem 
before imposing a suspicionless drug-testing policy.231 The Court 
justified the suspicionless drug-testing program because “the nationwide 
drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every 
school.”232 This broad holding has provided a clear path for schools to 
conduct a sweeping array of suspicionless search practices without first 
having to demonstrate a drug or weapons problem.233 As a result of this 
movement in the law, lower courts routinely justify the use of a variety 
of random, suspicionless search practices in schools.234 
 
 225. Id. at 826–27.  
 226. Id. at 827.  
 227. Id. at 824–25. 
 228. Id. at 830–38; see also Nance, supra note 76, at 384–87.  
 229. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 665 (1995)). 
 230. Id.  
 231. Id. at 835. 
 232. Id. at 834. 
 233. See supra Part II.A.3. But see Nance, supra note 76, at 391–94 (arguing that 
the Fourth Amendment requires school officials to have particularized evidence of a 
substance use or weapons problem before performing suspicionless searches that are 
“highly intrusive,” such as a search through a student’s personal belongings).  
 234. See supra Part II.A.3.  
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B. A Reformulated Balancing Test 
Many scholars have called for better balancing tests to evaluate 
citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights when government officials conduct 
suspicionless searches.235 Most of these scholars argue that courts should 
afford less weight to the government’s interest and more weight to the 
individuals’ interests.236 The reformulated balancing test proposed in this 
Article also maintains that courts should afford more weight to students’ 
interests under certain circumstances—but for reasons grounded 
primarily in pedagogy and the overall welfare of students. Working 
primarily within the existing Fourth Amendment framework, this 
Subpart identifies two different ways that a court can afford more 
weight—and why a court should afford more weight—to the students’ 
privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment when students are 
subjected to prison-like conditions in schools. The first way is rooted in 
the Court’s cases evaluating students’ rights under the First, Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The second way is to rethink the concept of 
“intrusion.” 
1. PEDAGOGICAL CONCERNS UNDERLIE THE COURT’S ANALYSES 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence evaluating students’ Fourth 
Amendment rights is better understood when viewed in connection with 
Supreme Court cases evaluating students’ First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. In these cases, the underlying justification for 
abridging students’ constitutional rights in schools, including their 
Fourth Amendment rights, is to promote the educational interests of the 
students.237 That is, courts reduce students’ constitutional rights to 
 
 235. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 29–46 (2013); Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity through Children’s Rights, 
2004 SUP. CT. REV. 355, 386–91; Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of 
Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1157–60 (2012); Eve 
Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254,  
296–97 (2011); Alexander A. Reinert, Public Interest(s) and Fourth Amendment 
Enforcement, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1461, 1494–1502 (2010); Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, 
supra note 182, at 553–55; Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy 
or Mutual Trust between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1784–85 
(1994). 
 236. See Slobogin, supra note 182, at 127.  
 237. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (holding that the 
current framework needed to evaluate students’ Fourth Amendment rights in schools 
must strike “a balance between the schoolchild’s legitimate expectations of privacy and 
the school’s equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can 
take place”). See also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1995) 
(holding that the nature of students’ Fourth Amendment rights in schools “is what is 
appropriate for children in school”); id. at 656 (“Fourth Amendment rights, no less than 
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provide school officials with the constitutional leeway to create an 
orderly environment conducive to learning.238 This Article maintains that 
when this justification no longer holds true—when conducting 
suspicionless searches or, worse, creating a prison-like environment 
contributes to a deteriorated learning climate and harms the educational 
interests of the students—students’ Fourth Amendment rights should not 
be abridged but strengthened. 
a. The foundational cases 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,239 the Court 
evaluated students’ First Amendment right to wear black armbands to 
publicize their objections to the Vietnam War and their support for a 
truce.240 When school officials became aware of the students’ plan to 
wear armbands, the officials adopted a policy that all students wearing 
armbands would be asked to remove them, and if they refused, they 
would be suspended until they did.241 When a group of students arrived 
at school wearing their armbands, they were sent home and suspended 
from school until they returned without them.242 
The Court famously held in Tinker that students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate,”243 and that “state-operated schools may not be 
enclaves of totalitarianism.”244 However, the Court also recognized the 
 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different in public schools than elsewhere; 
the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary 
responsibility for children.”); Kim, supra note 9, at 867.  
 238. While scholars disagree on how far students’ rights should extend in 
schools, as Catherine Kim recently observed, “both sides of the debate share a common 
starting point: such restrictions must be justified, if at all, by pedagogical goals.” Kim, 
supra note 9, at 866. See also Dupre, supra note 106, at 53 (applauding the Supreme 
Court’s recent jurisprudence that restricts students’ Fourth Amendment rights because 
doing so enhances the ability of school officials to provide students with a serious 
education); Levin, supra note 106, at 1648–49 (describing the need to find an equilibrium 
between respecting students’ constitutional rights so that students learn to value those 
rights, and restricting students’ rights to help school officials maintain an orderly 
environment conducive to learning); James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public 
Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1338–43 (2000) (arguing that courts understandably limit 
students’ free speech, right to privacy, and due process rights in schools because there, 
the government acts as an educator, and it would be impossible to “fully protect[] 
students’ constitutional rights while simultaneously ensuring the effective operation of 
public schools”). 
 239. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).  
 240. Id. at 505. 
 241. Id. at 504.  
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 506. 
 244. Id. at 511. 
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comprehensive authority of school officials “consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in schools.”245 
Thus, while the Court maintained that the Constitution protected the 
students’ right to express their views in schools, it also restricted those 
rights if speech “materially disrupt[ed] classwork or involve[d] 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”246 In Tinker, 
because the record did not show that the students materially disrupted the 
learning environment, interfered with school activities, or intruded in the 
lives of others, the Court concluded that the Constitution did not permit 
school officials to deny the students the right to wear their armbands at 
school.247 
Tinker is important because the Court clearly articulated the general 
principles for evaluating students’ constitutional rights in schools and 
established the tone for cases that would follow. Students do not shed 
their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate; yet, those rights must 
be balanced against the school’s interest in providing a productive 
learning environment. When students’ speech disrupts the learning 
environment, school officials can limit students’ First Amendment right 
to self-expression. Tinker is important for another reason as well. It 
demonstrates the Court’s attempt to align its constitutional jurisprudence 
affecting public schools with good educational policy. For example, the 
Court emphasized the pedagogical benefits of safeguarding students’ free 
speech rights. The Court noted that students are trained by exposure to a 
“marketplace of ideas,” and suppressing students’ expressions would 
dampen what should be a robust exchange of thoughts and opinions.248 
Further, the Court explained that safeguarding students’ free speech 
rights in schools would help them learn the importance of their 
constitutional rights and not discount them “as mere platitudes.”249 
Six years later, the Court invoked these same principles when 
evaluating students’ right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment in disciplinary proceedings. In Goss v. Lopez,250 the Court 
addressed whether a school district violated several high school students’ 
due process rights by temporarily suspending them without holding a 
 
 245. Id. at 507. 
 246. See id. at 513. 
 247. Id. at 514. 
 248. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).  
 249. Id. at 507 (quoting W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 
(1943)). The Court has relied on this line of reasoning in several other First Amendment 
cases when examining students’ constitutional rights. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 
393, 403–04 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); 
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986).  
 250. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
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hearing.251 One of those students, Dwight Lopez, was suspended in 
connection with a disturbance in the lunchroom that resulted in damage 
to school property.252 Lopez claimed that he did not participate in the 
destructive conduct but was only an innocent bystander.253 He was 
nevertheless suspended without a hearing.254 Another student, Betty 
Crome, was present at a demonstration that took place at a high school 
that she did not attend.255 After she was arrested with the other students 
and subsequently released without being formally charged, she received 
notice from her school that she had been suspended for ten days.256 The 
school did not provide a reason for the suspension; nor was Crome given 
a hearing.257 
The Court first held that although the Constitution does not 
guarantee the right to an education at the public’s expense, these students 
had a legitimate property interest because they were entitled to a public 
education under their state’s constitution, and that interest could not be 
taken away absent minimal procedures required under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.258 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that students were not 
entitled to the full panoply of protections normally provided to citizens 
under the Fourteenth Amendment in other contexts such as criminal 
proceedings.259 Thus, at least with respect to short suspensions, students 
were not entitled to secure counsel, confront or cross-examine witnesses, 
or call their own witnesses to support their version of the incident.260 
Rather, students facing suspension were guaranteed only “some kind of 
notice and afforded some kind of hearing.”261 The Court explained that in 
the vast majority of cases, this constitutional requirement would be met if 
school officials simply conducted “an informal give-and-take,” which 
included informing the student of the misconduct and the basis for the 
accusation, then providing the student with an opportunity to explain his 
or her version of the facts.262 
As in Tinker, the justification for abridging the students’ 
constitutional rights in Goss was to protect the state’s interest in 
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providing an environment conducive to learning.263 The Court reasoned 
that “[s]ome modicum of discipline and order is essential if the 
educational function is to be performed.”264 The Court acknowledged 
that disciplinary events are “frequent occurrences” and sometimes 
require immediate action to be effective.265 Thus, an immediate response 
to a violation of a school rule was not only “a necessary tool to maintain 
order but a valuable educational device.”266 Equally important, as in 
Tinker, Goss highlights the educational value of students retaining their 
constitutional rights. The Court explained that the risk of error without 
holding at least some kind of hearing “is not at all trivial,” and  
it would be a strange disciplinary system in an educational 
institution if no communication was sought by the 
disciplinarian with the student in an effort to inform him of his 
dereliction and to let him tell his side of the story in order to 
make sure that an injustice is not done.267  
Thus, it is apparent that the Court also was concerned that the students 
perceived that they were treated fairly in a government institution 
charged with teaching students about their constitutional rights.268 
In his dissent, Justice Lewis Powell, joined by three other Justices, 
sought to abridge students’ due process rights even further for 
pedagogical reasons, arguing that students should not be entitled even to 
the minimal due process protections outlined in the majority’s opinion.269 
According to Justice Powell, students had no legitimate need for due 
process protection because the government’s interest was aligned with 
the students’ best long-term interests.270 
In 1985, the Supreme Court in T.L.O. evaluated students’ Fourth 
Amendment rights in schools for the first time, following the same 
pattern it established in prior cases evaluating students’ free speech and 
 
 263. Id. at 580. 
 264. Id.  
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. The idea that suspension should be considered a “valuable educational 
device” has received substantial criticism by scholars. See, e.g., Noguera, supra note 62, 
at 342 (explaining that the students who are suspended or expelled often have the greatest 
academic, economic, and social needs).  
 267. Goss, 419 U.S. at 580. 
 268. See also Levin, supra note 106, at 1676 (arguing that procedural protections 
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participants in the educational process, which is an important value to convey in a 
democracy).  
 269. Goss, 419 U.S. at 585–86 (Powell, J., dissenting).  
 270. Id. at 592–93. 
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due process rights in Tinker and Goss.271 In T.L.O., a school official 
searched high school freshman T.L.O.’s purse for cigarettes after a 
teacher claimed that she spotted T.L.O. smoking in the bathroom and 
T.L.O. denied those accusations.272 During the search, the school official 
discovered marijuana and other materials suggesting that T.L.O. was 
dealing marijuana.273 The school official turned the evidence over to the 
police, who brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. in juvenile 
court.274 T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the school 
official’s search violated the Fourth Amendment.275 The Supreme Court 
disagreed.276 
As it did when evaluating students’ free speech and due process 
rights, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of the search by 
balancing T.L.O.’s expectation of privacy against the school’s need to 
maintain an orderly environment conducive to learning.277 The Court first 
explained that students have legitimate expectations of privacy in the 
personal items they bring to school.278 At the same time, the Court 
recognized that school officials have an “equally legitimate need to 
maintain an environment in which learning can take place.”279 To strike a 
balance, the Court held that school officials were not required to obtain a 
warrant before searching a student, and a school official’s level of 
suspicion need not rise to the level of “probable cause.”280 The Court 
reasoned that the warrant and probable cause requirements did not suit 
the “informality of the student-teacher relationship” because they would 
unduly burden school officials and interfere with “the swift and informal 
disciplinary procedures” necessary to maintain an effective and orderly 
learning climate.281 Rather, the constitutionality of a search in school 
depends on its reasonableness under the circumstances.282 The 
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determination of “reasonableness” involves a two-fold inquiry: (1) 
“‘whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,’” and (2) “whether 
the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’”283 
Using this framework, the Court concluded that the search was 
constitutional.284 
In his concurrence, Justice Powell reiterated his insistence that the 
government’s interest aligned with the students’ interests, making it 
“unnecessary to afford students the same constitutional protections 
granted adults and juveniles in a nonschool setting.”285 
The Court generally maintained this line of reasoning when 
evaluating students’ Fourth Amendment rights in the context of 
suspicionless searches in Vernonia and Earls. As explained above in 
both Vernonia and Earls—as in Tinker—the Court acknowledged that 
children “assuredly do not ‘shed their constitutional rights . . . at the 
schoolhouse gate,’”286 but reasoned that students’ “Fourth Amendment 
rights, no less than First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, are different 
in public schools than elsewhere.”287 According to the Court, the 
“reasonableness” inquiry could not disregard a school’s tutelary and 
custodial responsibilities; thus, the nature of a student’s Fourth 
Amendment rights “is what is appropriate for children in school.”288 
Further, in both cases, the Court justified the searches on the ground that 
the government’s interest and the students’ interest were aligned. For 
example, in Vernonia the Court explained that deterring drug use—
especially among student athletes—was important because of the 
physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs, and drug use 
disrupts the educational process.289 
 
 283. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).  
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More recently, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of 
a student search in Safford Unified School District v. Redding.290 In 
Redding, the Court did not evaluate the constitutionality of a random, 
suspicionless search as it did in Vernonia and Earls; instead, the Court 
evaluated the legality of a strip search performed on a thirteen-year-old 
female student who was accused of bringing unauthorized prescription 
and over-the-counter drugs to school.291 As in T.L.O., the Court again 
recognized that students’ Fourth Amendment rights are abridged in 
schools, reasoning that searches in the school setting “‘require[] some 
modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a 
search.’”292 Relying on the same two factors the Court delineated in 
T.L.O., the Court concluded that the search violated the Constitution 
because it was excessively intrusive in light of the age of the student and 
the nature of the school violation.293 Notably, as it had in prior cases, the 
Court in Redding displayed a willingness to rely on pedagogical 
considerations not only to justify the abridgment of students’ rights in 
schools, but also to make its determination of whether the search itself 
was constitutional. When evaluating the student’s expectation of privacy 
in the school setting, the Court acknowledged that the strip search was 
embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating, and that there was empirical 
evidence indicating that strip searches could “result in serious emotional 
damage” for students.294 It further noted that a strip search was so 
degrading to students that many schools had banned them under all 
circumstances.295 
b. A more balanced approach 
As the above cases demonstrate, the Court has repeatedly held that 
although students do not lose their constitutional rights upon entering the 
schoolhouse gates, students in school do not have the same rights they 
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have outside of school. A primary justification that the Court relies on to 
abridge students’ constitutional rights—including their Fourth 
Amendment rights—is to promote the educational interests of the 
students.296 Stated another way, for pedagogical reasons, the Court 
dilutes students’ constitutional rights to provide flexibility for school 
officials to preserve an orderly environment conducive to learning.297 
Relatedly, the Court also justifies reducing students’ constitutional rights 
on the ground that students’ interests are aligned with the government’s 
interest, and thus, heightened constitutional protections are unnecessary 
because school officials have students’ best interests in mind.298 
This Article maintains that if students can demonstrate that this 
justification is no longer true—that conducting random, suspicionless 
searches promotes an environment that is antithetical to learning or does 
not promote the educational interests of the students—their privacy 
interests should be given greater consideration against the government’s 
interest to conduct these searches. To make this assessment, a court 
should consider evidence regarding the effect of the challenged search 
practices on the learning environment. For example, the court might 
evaluate evidence assessing school climate; student learning; whether 
students are fearful and distrustful; whether school crime or disorder 
decreased or increased as a result of using these search tactics; and how 
the search practices affect students’ attitudes towards the government, 
school officials, teachers, and other students. In addition, the court might 
consider whether the use of these strict security measures exacerbates the 
school-to-prison pipeline by increasing the number of suspensions, 
expulsions, or referrals of students to the juvenile justice system for 
infractions that could be handled better internally. The court also might 
consider whether students attending schools with high minority 
populations perceive that they are being treated differently than students 
in other settings. Using such criteria, a court could declare these 
suspicionless search practices unconstitutional, which would encourage 
schools to rely on alternative measures to decrease crime and, if 
necessary, to conduct searches based only on individualized suspicion. 
Such a test more closely aligns with the overall tenor of cases evaluating 
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students’ constitutional rights in schools and is more consistent with 
good education policy and practice.299 
To be clear, I do not propose that school officials should never be 
permitted to use strict security measures; perhaps there are circumstances 
where it would be appropriate to use them.300 Nevertheless, this modified 
framework would send a clear message to school administrators that 
strict security measures should be used only when they promote the 
educational interests of the students rather than as a first response to 
address school crime and disorder. 
A proposed modification to align the constitutional rights of 
juveniles with good policy grounded in empirical evidence, of course, is 
not unprecedented in the case law. For example, at one time, adolescents 
in juvenile court were not entitled to traditional procedural protections 
provided to adults in criminal court because it was assumed that juvenile 
courts were nonadversarial institutions with adolescents’ best interests in 
mind.301 However, in light of the growing body of evidence that juvenile 
court officials failed to provide adolescents with benevolent protection, 
the Court in In re Gault302 determined that it was appropriate to extend at 
least some procedural protections to adolescents.303 Similarly, in Miller v. 
Alabama,304 Graham v. Florida,305 and Roper v. Simmons,306 the Court 
relied on social science to conclude that the Eighth Amendment 
precluded (1) a sentencing scheme mandating life in prison without the 
possibility of parole for juveniles who committed homicide, (2) life 
without parole for juveniles who committed a non-homicide offense, and 
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(3) the death penalty for juveniles.307 And, in Safford Unified School 
District v. Redding, the most recent case evaluating students’ Fourth 
Amendment rights in schools, the Court cited social science evidence 
indicating that strip searches could “result in serious emotional damage” 
for students because they are so degrading.308 
Further, this modification is fundamentally consistent with other 
proposed Fourth Amendment balancing tests in other contexts. For 
example, Alexander Reinert characterizes the reasonableness balancing 
test as pitting the government interest against an individual’s privacy 
interest but maintains that the government interest should be construed 
more broadly to include important collective values, such as pluralist 
civic participation and the efficient administration of criminal justice.309 
According to Reinert, when searches undermine long-term public 
interests such as ostracizing subgroups from the political process or 
hindering future law enforcement efforts by increasing distrust between 
students and law enforcement, courts might declare suspicionless search 
practices to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.310 Shima 
Baradaran argues that when analyzing suspicionless searches, courts 
should consider broader societal data, such as potential racial targeting or 
low hit rates, instead of making less-informed balancing decisions based 
on only common sense.311 Fundamentally similar to these proposals, this 
Article essentially argues that courts should consider school data 
regarding the short-term and long-term impacts of suspicionless searches 
on the learning environment to make an informed balancing decision 
under the Fourth Amendment.312 
 
 307. See Miller 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (using social science to justify the decision to 
preclude a sentencing scheme that mandated life in prison without the possibility of 
parole for juvenile offenders); Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 74 (using social science to justify 
the decision to preclude life without parole for juveniles who commit crimes other than 
homicide); Roper, 543 U.S. at 573–74 (using social science to justify the decision to 
preclude the death penalty for a juvenile defender). See also Barry C. Feld, Adolescent 
Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, 
Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 L. & INEQUALITY 263, 264, 277–92 (2013) 
(analyzing the social science research on which the Court relied in Roper, Graham, and 
Miller).  
 308. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 373–74 (2009) (citing 
Hyman & Perone, supra note 294, at 13).  
 309. Reinert, supra note 235, at 1467.  
 310. Id. at 1464–67, 1484–89. 
 311. See Baradaran, supra note 235, at 39, 43–45.  
 312. These rebalancing tests are consistent with the social science research that 
demonstrates social costs associated with rules, policies, and laws that people view as 
unfair, degrading, and intrusive. See Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 142, at 514; Tyler & 
Rankin, supra note 141, at 361; see also supra Part II.C. 
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c. Criticisms of the reformulated approach 
Some might criticize this reformulated approach by arguing that the 
justification for abridging students’ rights under the Fourth Amendment 
is distinct from the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They might argue 
that the Court’s justification, especially in Earls, is primarily grounded in 
student safety concerns, not in having an orderly environment conducive 
to learning.313 They also might argue that school officials should have the 
constitutional leeway to use strict security measures to protect students at 
almost all costs. My response to these arguments is twofold. 
First, I maintain that a more complete view of the jurisprudence on 
students’ constitutional rights—and even of the jurisprudence addressing 
only students’ Fourth Amendment rights—is that safety is only one 
aspect, albeit an important aspect, of an overarching concern for allowing 
school officials to have the flexibility to fulfill their “custodial” and 
“tutelary” responsibilities by providing an orderly environment 
conducive to learning.314 While student safety is important, it is certainly 
not the sole—or even the primary—responsibility of public schools.315 
Rather, a more balanced look at the jurisprudence suggests that the Court 
reduces students’ constitutional rights so that school officials can have 
the flexibility to provide for the well-being of children. The way that 
school officials primarily go about providing for the well-being of 
children is to treat them with dignity and to provide them with an 
appropriate learning environment. If courts permit school officials to 
treat students like prisoners, students’ overall well-being is jeopardized, 
and the learning environment is compromised. Stated another way, 
school officials should not be able to hide behind the Constitution when 
they treat students like prisoners because they are trying to keep students 
“safe”—especially when there are more effective means for creating safe 
schools that do not harm the learning environment or impair students’ 
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dignity.316 Furthermore, we must remember that strict security measures 
do not guarantee students’ safety, and, in fact, may even compromise 
it.317 Indeed, maintaining an appropriate learning environment is simply a 
better foundation on which to build the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
analysis. 
Second, even if student safety is the sole justification by which the 
Court abridges students’ Fourth Amendment rights, as explained above, 
many scholars argue that implementing strict security measures increases 
student behavioral problems and crime by alienating students.318 
Accordingly, I propose that students, at minimum, should have the 
opportunity to submit evidence demonstrating that the use of strict 
security measures has not improved student safety. If this can be shown, 
then students’ Fourth Amendment rights should be given greater 
consideration against the government’s interest. 
Some might also criticize the reformulated approach because it 
provides less deference to school officials. They might argue that courts 
should not second-guess school officials’ decision to use strict security 
measures, nor should courts make assessments regarding the school 
environment, because school officials are in a better position to make 
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 Nearly all teachers at Lake Erie report problems with robbery in the 
building, gang activity, fights, disorder, and disrespect, and three-quarters of 
teachers report that students threaten them with violence. Interactions 
between students and teachers are frequently hostile and mutually 
disrespectful; students’ and teachers’ frustration with one another are easily 
visible. An algebra teacher at Lake Erie complains that constant disruption 
“impedes the teaching process”; repeated conflicts make it difficult, he 
continues, for teachers “to reach students who want to learn as deeply as you 
know [they] could.” Another teacher observes, “I see behavior problems I 
have never seen before . . . I get cursed out almost daily.” . . . Violence inside 
and outside the school creates a climate of mistrust, antagonism, and fear. 
Id. 
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such judgments. My response to this criticism is again twofold. First, 
courts already make assessments regarding the learning environment 
under the First Amendment analysis. For example, as Tinker explains, 
school officials may restrict students’ free speech rights if speech 
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or 
invasion of the rights of others.”319 Second, courts have the responsibility 
to limit school officials’ actions when those actions impinge upon 
students’ civil rights. In fact, in the current politically charged 
environment, courts have the responsibility to clarify students’ Fourth 
Amendment rights and should insist that schools preserve students’ 
privacy and dignity by finding alternative ways to deter school crime, 
especially in light of the fact that minorities are disproportionately 
subjected to these intrusive measures. 
2. THE COMBINED EFFECT AMOUNTS TO A SUBSTANTIAL INTRUSION 
A second way in which a court can afford more weight to students’ 
privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment is to rethink the concept 
of “intrusion.” As explained above, lower courts routinely justify the use 
of a variety of random, suspicionless search practices in schools because 
they deem each individual search in isolation as “minimally intrusive.”320 
This Article maintains that a more appropriate analysis of intrusion 
involves examining the cumulative effect of using all these measures 
together instead of evaluating each measure in isolation. Indeed, it is the 
cumulative effect of these measures that amounts to a substantial 
invasion of students’ privacy, harming students’ educational progress. 
The recent testimony from the U.S. Senate Committee Hearing on 
Ending the School-to-Prison Pipeline provides a sobering illustration of 
how intrusive using a combination of these surveillance methods can 
be.321 Edward Ward, a twenty-year-old honor roll student at DePaul 
University, attended public schools on the West Side of Chicago, where 
90 percent of the students were low-income and 100 percent were 
minority students.322 Ward described his school as his “own personal 
prison.”323 He stated that “[f]rom the moment we stepped through the 
doors in the morning, we were faced with metal detectors, x-ray 
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machines and uniformed security. Upon entering school, it was like we 
stepped into a prison.”324 He continues: 
My school’s environment was very tense; the halls were full 
with school security officers whose only purpose seemed to be 
to serve students with detentions or suspensions. Many of the 
school security officers were very disrespectful to students; 
some of them spoke to us as if we were animals. They were 
constantly yelling and antagonizing us from the moment we 
stepped into the halls until we reached our destination. This 
was nerve-wracking for me, because although I was an honor 
student, I felt constantly in a state of alert, afraid to make even 
the smallest mistake or create a noise that could enable the 
security officers to serve me with a detention. Instead of feeling 
like I could trust them, I felt I couldn’t go to them for general 
security issues because I would first be interrogated before 
anything would get done. . . . The officers don’t get any special 
training to be in the school so they don’t treat us like we are 
misbehaving; they treat us like we are committing crimes. . . .  
These policies and actions disheartened me. I could slowly see 
the determination to get an education fade from the faces of my 
peers because they were convinced that they no longer 
mattered, . . . the last thing that would work is to place them in 
institutions of confinement and control.325 
In another example, Minerva Dickson views her high school as a 
prison.326 Every day before being allowed to enter, Minerva waits in a 
long line as each student is subject to various security checks.327 When 
Minerva finally arrives to the front of the line, she first swipes an 
identification card through a machine.328 Then she walks to the metal 
detectors that are monitored by several police officers.329 While the 
police officers stand watching, Minerva removes her jewelry, hairpins, 
and shoes, then puts her personal bags on a conveyor belt to be 
scanned.330 Finally, Minerva stands with her arms out and legs spread as 
an officer runs a security wand around her body.331 Minerva then collects 
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her things, puts on her shoes, and hurries to her first class.332 When asked 
how she feels about school security, she responds, “They treat[] us like 
criminals. It ma[kes] me hate school. When you cage up students like 
that it doesn’t make us safe, it makes things worse.”333 
In these examples, and probably thousands of others, it is clear that 
something fundamentally wrong is happening. While being treated like a 
criminal may involve more than a privacy violation and intrudes on one’s 
dignity, it also seems clear that the cumulative effect of using all of these 
measures together amounts to a significant intrusion of students’ privacy 
interests and can and should be evaluated as such. 
CONCLUSION 
After several highly publicized incidents of school violence, the 
public school environment—just like the public environment—is 
changing. The use of surveillance methods, which was uncommon 
decades ago, is now commonplace among schools. Yet, empirical 
evidence demonstrates that not all schools rely on surveillance methods 
in the same manner. A recent empirical study shows that low-income and 
minority students are much more likely to experience intense, prison-like 
conditions than other students, even after accounting for conditions that 
plausibly would lead school officials to adopt strict security measures 
such as neighborhood crime, school crime, and school disorder. 
While the appropriate response to these findings must be 
multi-faceted, courts have an important role to play. This Article offers a 
reformulated balancing test under the Fourth Amendment to address 
these conditions that is rooted in the Court’s analysis of students’ rights 
under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. A modified Fourth 
Amendment framework has the advantage of safeguarding all students’ 
Fourth Amendment rights and rectifying the deleterious environment that 
intense surveillance conditions create in schools. Further, because 
students of color are more often subjected to such intense environments, 
applying this test will help address the disproportionate use of strict 
security measures on minorities. While addressing this problem is only 
one aspect of the inequalities that minority students experience in 
schools, it is a key component to addressing the school-to-prison pipeline 
and creating quality educational experiences that most white students 
enjoy and all students deserve. 
 
 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
